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Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia,
and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture
DONI GEWIRTZMAN*
INTRODUCTION

In 1981, Richard Parker, then an up-and-coming constitutional theorist at
Harvard Law School, issued a call to arms to his academic colleagues from the
"generation of the 1960s." 1 A year earlier, John Hart Ely and Jesse Choper had
released a pair of books that sought to reconcile judicial review with core
principles of democratic self-govemance. 2 Each had sought to limit the Supreme Court's institutional role by allocating much of the responsibility for
defining constitutional values to the representative branches, confining the
Court's mission to safeguarding democratic processes from malfunction.
Ely and Choper's fatal error, according to Parker, was their conclusion that
American representative democracy is-for the most part-alive and well. 3
Parker reminded them of the large numbers of Americans who do not participate in the political process, questioned whether citizens can rely upon their
representatives to reflect their interests, and underscored the difficulty many
citizens have in determining what their own interests actually are. 4 He accused
them of "obscur[ing] our biased, withered politics in a fog of apologetic
rhetoric," and justifying a political system that "consecrates the domination of
our polity by the politically effective few and the reduction of the rest to more
or less passive consumers of the ministration of govemment." 5
Parker called upon his generational cohort to move constitutional theory in a
new descriptive and normative direction, reminding his contemporaries that
they "grew up in an era when it was virtually impossible to feel comfortable
with the status quo." 6 In response to Choper and Ely, he urged constitutional
theorists to not only adopt a realistic and more critical view of American

* Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law. I owe considerable thanks to
Rachel Barkow, Adam Berinsky, Barry Friedman, Daryl Levinson, Robert Post, Mark Tushnet, members of the NYU Lawyering faculty-particularly Kerry Abrams, Laura Bradford, Marshall Miller, and
Juliet Stumpf-along with Nicholas Bagley, Aaron Beim, and the editors at the Georgetown Law
Journal.
1. Richard Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 223 (1981).
2. JESSE H. CHOPER, JumcIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL PROCESS (1980); JoHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
3. As Parker describes Ely and Choper's theory, while governmental decisionmakers are responsive
to majoritarian interests, minority interests are generally accounted for through shifting majority
coalitions that require minority support for governance. In certain discrete cases of system malfunction,
minorities are unable to compete on the same terms as other political interests. At those points, judicial
intervention is appropriate. But in general, the representative democratic process is well equipped to
resolve questions of constitutional meaning. Parker, supra note 1, at 240-41.
4. Id. at 242--44.
5. Id. at 253.
6. Id. at 257.
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politics, but also to begin imagining how constitutional law might help to
develop a polity that would better reflect classical republican ideals of equality,
civic virtue, and a mobilized citizenry. 7
Today, Parker's generation-and its immediate progeny-is ascendant. And
under its watch, "the People" have become constitutional theory's hottest
fashion. Yet these scholars, who saw more clearly than most how popular
engagement can alter the course of history, 8 have retained their elders' limited
perspective on popular engagement with political life.
A growing body of scholarship has coalesced around the concept of "popular
constitutionalism." Following a trail blazed by Robert Cover, 9 Bruce Ackerman, 10 Sanford Levinson, 11 and Parker, 12 among others, more recent works
include a book by Larry Kramer, 13 a 2003 Foreword by Robert Post, 14 and other
articles and books by Jeremy Waldron, 15 Kramer, 16 Reva Siegel, 17 William
Eskridge, 18 Jack Balkin, 19 Keith Whittington, 20 Stephen Griffin, 21 James Gray

7. Id. at 258. For similar efforts aimed at integrating classical republican ideals into constitutional
theory, see, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Coun, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of SelfGovemment, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond rhe Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539 (1988).
8. See generally TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HoPE, DAYS OF RAGE ( 1987).
9. Robert Cover, The Supreme Coun, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L.
REv. 4 (1983).
10. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS];
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). Ackerman has argued that the People act
outside the Article V amendment process during isolated "constitutional moments." See ACKERMAN,
FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 6-7; Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984). During other periods of "normal politics," the People cede their
interpretive authority back to political institutions. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 263. Popular
constitutionalists, by contrast, have advanced constitutional models that bring the People into play
during eras of "normal politics."
11. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
12. RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE" (1994).
13. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004).
14. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Coun, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2003).
15. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
16. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REv. 959 (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism]; Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Coun, 2000 Term-Foreword:
We the Coun, 115 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Coun].
17. Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 297 (2001).
18. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Effects]; William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 419
(2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Channeling].
19. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1045 (2001).
20. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773 (2002).
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Pope, 22 and Mark Tushnet. 23
Each argues that the People and their elected representatives should-and
often do-play a substantial role in the creation, interpretation, evolution, and
enforcement of constitutional norms. This popular involvement takes place
through the political process, but outside the formal confines of an Article V
amendment or a "constitutional moment." 24 At times, the People's interpretive
expression takes place through direct action, like protests, boycotts, and petitioning. At other times, the People act through electorally accountable institutions
and political parties.
These alternative narratives seek to remove the constitutional lawmaking
process from the judiciary's exclusive dominion. Constitutional interpretation-in real or idealized form-is envisioned as the product of a "constitutional culture," 25 a larger community-wide discourse that includes judicial and
nonjudicial actors, a mixture of legal norms and political actions, and a wide
range of interpretive expression.
But while constitutional theory has focused on reconstituting the People as a
major player in constitutional interpretation, political scientists have been busy
exploring how the People actually relate to politics and political institutions.
Their work offers a much-needed snapshot of the political context in which
constitutional norms are created. 26
The results are not pretty. At precisely the same moment that some constitutional theorists are highlighting popular involvement in the mechanics of constitutional interpretation, political scientists tell us that participation and interest in
politics are declining. 27 Moreover, popular interpretive opinions are often based
on limited information, and are highly susceptible to manipulation by elites.
Many citizens engage constitutional culture with a declining sense of their
ability to grasp critical issues in public life, influence policy outcomes, and

21. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CoNSTITlfflONALISM: FROM THEORY TO PoLmcs ( 1996); Stephen M.
Griffin, What ls Constitutional Theory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition,
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 493 (1989).
22. James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997) [hereinafter Pope,
Labor's Constitution]; James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in
the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287 (1990).
23. MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITlfflON AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
24. See supra note 10.
25. Siegel, supra note 17, at 303 (defining "constitutional culture" as a "network of understandings
and practices that structure our constitutional tradition, including those that shape law but would not be
recognized as 'lawmaking' according to the legal system's own formative criteria"); see also Post,
supra note 14, at 8 (defining "constitutional culture" as "a specific subset of culture that encompasses
extrajudicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution").
26. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PuTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000); STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JoHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1993); SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEGMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND
EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1995).
27. This disconnect is not surprising given the comparatively limited attention paid by legal
academics to political science scholarship. See Keith Whittington, Crossing Over: Citation of Public
Law Faculty in Law Reviews, 14 LAW & CTs. 5, 9 (2004).
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perform basic self-governance tasks.
On one level, popular constitutionalists are simply-and I believe correctlyrecognizing what historians and political scientists have long known: "[T]he
Constitution lives a vibrant and consequential life outside the courts." 28 This
represents a great leap forward for constitutional theory, which has only recently begun to shift from the normative quest for a Grand Unified Interpretive
Theory to models that display a deeper descriptive engagement with how our
constitutional system actually operates.
But on another level, the divergence between legal academics and political
scientists shows this academic generation falling into precisely the same trap as
those that came before. If Ely and Choper's sin was an inability to recognize the
widening chasm between theory and practice, that gap remains stronger than
ever.
The problem begins with "the People," a term popular constitutionalists
invoke with some regularity but are reluctant to define. 29 To the extent there is a
shared definition, it apparently refers to any participant in constitutional interpretation who is not a federal judge. At different times, "the' People" inhabit the
shoes of, among other entities, the electorate, prominent interest groups, identitybased social movements, 30 the United States Congress, 31 the President, 32 political parties, 33 state government institutions, 34 or impact-litigation plaintiffs. 35
The result is an academic construction where "the People" look a lot like
Woody Allen's Zelig, inhabiting whatever incarnation is needed to conform
with the theoretical backdrop.
This lack of definition allows scholars to claim democratic legitimacy and
invoke a populist legacy for their interpretive narratives without having to
examine the nuts and bolts of how our political system actually operates. It also
permits popular constitutionalists to project all sorts of images onto this blank
slate, including nostalgic portrayals of popular civic engagement from days long
past.
Abstractions also dominate normative conversations about popular constitutionalism. Legal scholars have distilled perspectives on "the People" into two
highly polarized visions: one that trusts the People to make interpretive deci28. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE. L.J. 1943, 2022 (2003).
29. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Are "The People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 Tux. L.
REv. 855, 891 (2005) (reviewing LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JumcIAL REvrnw (2004)) (describing Kramer's definition of "the People" as "maddeningly ambiguous").

30. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 18, at 423.
31. See Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 2004.
32. See Keith E. Whittington, Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of
Constitutional Meaning, 33 POLITY 365 (2001).
33. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 19, at 1077-78.
34. See Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional
Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 873-75 (1999).
35. See Eskridge, Effects, supra note 18, at 2071-72.
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sions about what the Constitution means, and one that does not. 36 This stark
distinction does constitutional theory a disservice by ignoring what is actually
known about how real, live Americans think and behave. The individual citizen,
and the actual nature of her relationship with constitutional culture, remains
largely ignored.
By treating the People as a construction rather than a collection of real
individuals who, as it turns out, we know quite a bit about, constitutional theory
sidesteps many of the more complex and problematic aspects of how popular
constitutionalism actually works. Hence, in using the term "the People," this
Article refers to citizens-not elected representatives, interest groups, political
parties, or other intermediaries. 37 Citizens are, admittedly, only one part of a
representative democratic culture in which an individual's relationship with
governance is often mediated by third parties. But defining their identity and
isolating their distinct role apart from representative institutions is critical, both
to understanding what popular constitutionalists mean when they use the word
"popular" and to breaking down the abstractions upon which constitutional
theory has grown far too reliant.
In tum, this Article is an effort to use political science to examine how the
People relate to, engage with, and feel about constitutional culture. It concludes
that constitutional culture:
• involves a relatively small number of engaged participants;
• often acts to reinforce judicial authority;
• operates with unstable popular preferences that are easily subject to elite
manipulation;
• reflects wide disparities in wealth and power that exist within our larger
political culture; and
• responds to long-term political trends, including declining civic engagement among younger generations.
These conclusions-none of which receive any significant treatment in the
recent popular-constitutionalist literature 38-raise descriptive questions about

36. See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935,
1950-54 (1995) (book review) (distinguishing "populist" and "progressive" influences on constitutional
theory); PARKER, supra note 12, at 54--65 (distinguishing between "Populist" and "Anti-Populist"
sensibilities); Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 1003--04 (describing skepticism
about people and democracy as a pervasive feature of contemporary intellectual culture); LEVINSON,
supra note II, at 27 (distinguishing between Catholic and Protestant perspectives on constitutional
interpretation).
37. See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism? 118 HARV. L REv.
1594, 1606--07 (2005) (reviewing LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CoNSTifUTIONALISM
AND JumcIAL REVIEW (2004) (distinguishing between "The People" as an "organic unity" and '"the
people' -the collection of human persons who are the citizens or residents of a particular polity").
38. Among popular constitutionalists, Bruce Ackerman comes closest to addressing these realities.
Under Ackerman's theory, constitutional interpretation operates largely under conditions of "normal
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how popular constitutionalism operates today and pragmatic concerns for its
continued operation and viability.
Part I sets out two dueling narratives that have defined the current theoretical
debate about how constitutional law is made and the interplay between law and
politics. It provides a brief account of the Court's recent efforts to assert its
interpretive supremacy, and describes popular constitutionalist efforts to cast the
People as a systemic check on judicial power.
Part II sets out a conflict between current trends in constitutional theory and
political science. It accuses popular constitutionalists of maintaining a nostalgic
view of the People that ignores contemporary political trends, and sets out three
points of contact between "citizen-interpreters" and constitutional culture: preferences, participation, and legitimacy.
Parts III, IV, and V examine efforts by political scientists to describe the
People's relationship with constitutional culture. Part III explores the feasibility
of popular constitutionalism under current levels of political participation and
knowledge, arguing that the relatively distant relationship between the People
and political life creates inhospitable conditions for placing increased interpretive burdens on ordinary citizens. Part IV addresses how interpretive norms
obtain legitimacy. It uses studies about the People's perceptions of institutional
processes and their own capacity for self-governance to suggest that popular
accountability does not necessarily lead to more legitimate interpretive outcomes. Part V looks at constitutional culture in operation, focusing on how
participation and knowledge levels affect popular representation, and the influence of elites on public opinion.
Part VI examines the theoretical implications of these political trends. It
challenges popular constitutionalism's portrayal of contemporary politics, and
questions whether the current political environment is hospitable to interpretive
models that rely upon significant citizen involvement. Finally, it suggests an
agenda for a new generation of constitutional scholars, one that draws on a
shared experience with apathy and alienation from political life during our
formative development in the years after Watergate.
This Article operates with two limiting principles in mind. First, in examining
the People's role in constitutional culture, it is confined to an examination of
what we know about how citizens determine, communicate, and legitimize their
interpretive preferences. We do, however, live in a representative democracy.
By constitutional design, interpretive preferences are filtered through representative institutions that, as many have noted, play a critical role in the evolution of

politics," during which "the People simply do not exist" because their political attention and energies
are focused on other, nonconstitutional matters. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 263. During
these periods, the Court performs a preservationist function, representing the absent People by acting as
"an ongoing representative" of constitutional commitments made during periods of heightened popular
mobilization and involvement. Id. at 264--65. But by eliminating popular engagement in the interpretive
process during wide swaths of constitutional history, Ackerman is no longer operating within the
popular constitutionalist model. See Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 961 n.3.
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constitutional doctrine. 39 An in-depth examination of how other political actors,
including the legislative and executive branches, respond to popular interpretive
expression is well worthy of further examination, but is beyond the scope of this
piece.
Second, popular constitutionalism is often connected to a normative debate
about the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review. This Article deliberately
avoids that well-traveled path. 40 Instead of focusing upon whether judge-made
constitutional law is better or worse than law created from other sources, it
operates from a more descriptive perspective, examining how popular engagement with constitutional culture actually operates. As Barry Friedman has
noted, an accurate descriptive account of how our interpretive system functions
has been all too absent from constitutional theory. 41 Indeed, such an account is
necessary in order to fully assess the relative merits of competing normative
models. 42 This is an effort to move that discussion from the realm of abstraction
and ground it in the reality of contemporary American political life.
I. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, PoLmcs, AND POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM

Contemporary constitutional theory is caught in a battle between two different stories about how constitutional interpretation occurs. The first--coined the
"juricentric Constitution" by Robert Post and Reva Siegel-places constitutional interpretation exclusively in the hands of the judicial branch. 43 The
second, offered in different forms by popular constitutionalist scholars, suggests
a process that is far more complex and posits a greater interpretive role for the
People.

39. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv.
707 (1985); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359 (1997); Robert Nagel, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 380 (1988); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law ls, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); David A.
Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 113 (1993); Whittington,
supra note 32.
40. For an exhaustive account of this long-running academic debate, see Barry Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971
(2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, History Part Five].
41. See Friedman, History Part Five, supra note 40, at 257-58.
42. This assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that constitutional theorists offer theoretical models with the
eventual goal of implementing these models in the real world.
43. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L. REv. 1, 2 (2003).
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A. THE "IURICENTRIC" NARRATIVE

The act of unifying a diverse and growing body of scholarship under the
"popular constitutionalism" mantle is something of a stretch. The works mix
descriptive and normative assertions, encompassing historical interactions between law and politics, affirmative assaults on judicial supremacy, and speculation about the current Court's attentiveness to external political dynamics. The
theoretical conversation also exists at a point of intersection for numerous
constitutional dialogues, from the longstanding battle over the role of an
unelected judiciary in a representative democracy to more recent academic hand
wringing over the federal judiciary's conservative shift in the post-Reagan era.
Popular constitutionalism, as used here, describes a body of academic work
that shares a common enemy. As Robert Post and Reva Siegel explain it,
popular constitutionalist scholars are attacking a story about how constitutional
law is made. 44 That narrative prioritizes stability, embraces legal terminology
and categories, and above all, places federal courts generally-and the Supreme
Court in particular-at center stage.
The story's primary components are two interrelated and reciprocally reinforcing assumptions that find little explicit support in modem academic literature,
but are nevertheless pervasive within contemporary constitutional discourse:
judicial supremacy (the notion that judges have the final say in questions of
constitutional meaning), and the existence of a rigid division between the
worlds of law and politics.
In this "juricentric" narrative, the judiciary stands as "the exclusive guardian
of the Constitution" and the supreme expositor of constitutional meaning. 45
Aside from a few well-documented and oft-repeated exceptions,46 and the
Article V amendment process, the evolution of constitutional meaning is an
entirely judge-driven process.
With judges in the interpretive driver's seat, constitutional law becomes
nearly indistinguishable from "ordinary law."47 As we do with a run-of-the-mill
statute, we turn to the courts for answers when a question arises about the
meaning of a constitutional provision. Judges, in keeping with their training and
practice, then apply traditional tools of legal analysis that closely resemble
those used to interpret ordinary statutes. 48
The judiciary's pre-eminent role follows from the assumption that constitutional law is separate from politics, and that this separation is essential to the

44. See id.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Standard examples include Thomas Jefferson's efforts to fight Federalist policies, Andrew
Jackson's veto of legislation to recharter the Second National Bank, Abraham Lincoln's response to the
Dred Scott decision, and Roosevelt's battles over New Deal legislation. See Whittington, supra note 32,
at 369.
47. See Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 8-9.
48. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 18 (1996);
Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 8-9.
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very definition of constitutionalism. 49 If constitutions are a shared precommitment to preserve longstanding political processes and values in the face of
impulsive popular and political movements, 50 judges--comparatively insulated
from politics by constitutional design-are the only constitutional actors capable of interpretive actions consistent with the fundamental purpose of constitutionalism. 51
The result is a vision of interpretive development that exists firmly outside
the rough-and-tumble world of political life. 52 As Keith Whittington describes
it:
There is a tendency to regard the Constitution as primarily a legal document:
constitutional law substitutes for the Constitution, and the exercise of judicial
review is regarded as tantamount to constitutionalism itself; the Constitution
is considered relevant to politics as a consequence of and only to the extent
that the judiciary is willing to enforce its terms and block the actions of
government officials. 53

In recent years, the Rehnquist Court has evolved into the juricentric narrative's strongest proponent. The primary vehicle for the Court's assertion of
judicial supremacy has been the curtailment of legislative power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress "the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation," the Amendment's substantive guarantees. 54
As numerous scholars have pointed out, judicial supremacy is an explicit
component of the Rehnquist Court's Section Five jurisprudence, 55 bringing to
an end a collaborative effort by Congress and the Court to expand constitutional
rights during the New Deal and Great Society eras. 56 In a recent decision
upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act against a Section Five challenge,
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that "it falls to this Court, not Congress, to
define the substance of constitutional guarantees." 57 This mirrors similar statements in Garrett and Kimel, where the Court held Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act inapplicable to
state govemments, 58 and City of Boerne v. Flores, where the Court held that
Congress exceeded its Section Five authority in passing the Religious Freedom
49. See Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 990-91.
50. See Laurence H. Tribe, The People's Court, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 24, 2004, § 7, at 32.
51. See Post, supra note 14, at 11.
52. See Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1946.
53. KEITH E. WHITITNGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DNIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING 1 (1999).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
55. See Kramer, We the Coun, supra note 16, at 143-51; Post & Siegel, supra note 43, at 2;
Whittington, supra note 20, at 776.
56. See MARK TusHNET, THE NEW CoNSTITUTIONAL ORDER 50-51 (2003).
57. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003).
58. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
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Restoration Act of 1993. 59 The end result is a clear division of labor between
the legislative and judicial departments: the Court tells Congress and the People
what the Constitution means, 60 and Congress can only pass legislation to
remedy a pattern of discrimination that falls within the Court's interpretation. 61
The current Court's assertion of supremacy is driven in no small part by its
skepticism about democratic institutions and procedures. 62 Recent decisions
cast a suspicious eye on congressional factfinding procedures63 and reveal
concern about the ability of democratic institutions to provide for their own
stability without some form of judicially imposed order. 64
The Court's internal discourse also reflects the juricentric narrative's pull
across ideological divisions. For example, Justice Stevens's dissent in Bush v.
Gore all but accuses the majority of grounding its decisionmaking in political
considerations, thus undermining "the Nation's confidence in the judge as an
impartial guardian of the rule of law." 65 Justice Scalia, in tum, in his dissent in
Lawrence v. Texas charged the Court with "tak[ing] sides in the culture war,
departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules
of engagement are observed."66 Each dissent-from opposite ideological polesasserts an ideal in which the judicial role is tied to a rigid separation between
law and politics, and the judiciary stands fully immunized against the corrosive
effects of political life.
B. THE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALIST NARRATIVE

Against this doctrinal backdrop, popular constitutionalists have developed a
very different story about how constitutional law is made. In this narrative, the
People-in one incarnation or another-play an active role in the development
of constitutional doctrine through a mixture of explicitly interpretive and political acts that occur both within and outside the courtroom.
In the eyes of popular constitutionalists, constitutional law is the product of a
"constitutional culture" in which judges are only one of many interpretive
actors. 67 As Post explains it, the Court is engaged in a "continuous dialogue
with the constitutional beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors." 68 Nonjudicial

59. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 866-67 (1992) (plurality opinion); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
61. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
62. See TusHNET, supra note 56, at 94 ("[A]s the Court sees it, politicians engage in grandstanding
for their constituents, adopting legislation that seems 'good' in the abstract but that has no decent policy
justification, and in which, again as the Court sees it, new forms of interest groups, labeling themselves
as serving the public interest, push legislation forward.").
63. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80 (2001).
64. See Richard H. Pildes, Bush v. Gore: Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 695 (2001).
65. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. See Post, supra note 14, at 11; Siegel, supra note 17, at 302.
68. Post, supra note 14, at 41.
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actors mobilize around and stake claims about constitutional meaning, using
multiple "communicative pathways"-including Section Five-for interpretive
expression that transcend the barrier between law and politics. 69
In support of their model, popular constitutionalists offer an array of historical case studies in which interpretive outputs are produced by a dialogue
between the Court and the People. These examples are rich with accounts of
popular civic engagement, often expressed through large-scale social movements. In each, the People air interpretive claims through a range of acts inside
and outside the courtroom, including social activism, mass mobilization, legislative lobbying, electoral preferences, and the acts of elected representatives. 70
Reva Siegel, for example, recounts the multifront political offensive launched
by the women's movement in the 1970s to pass the Equal Rights Amendment
and other pieces of legislation. 71 She describes a process in which the movement created constitutional meaning through "constitutional text, collective
memory, mass action, the techniques of social movement organizing, the beginnings of a litigation campaign, the apparatus of the party system, and finally, the
lawmaking resources of Congress itself." 72 In the end, the movement successfully advanced a revised set of constitutional norms governing sex discrimination, despite its failure to formally amend the Constitution. 73
Working in a similar vein, James Gray Pope details American unionists'
efforts to achieve constitutional recognition for their right to organize. These
"constitutional insurgents" sought to alter constitutional meaning by communicating and operating outside formal political channels, exercising "direct popular power, for example through extralegal assemblies, mass protests, strikes, and
boycotts." 74 Pope's protagonists act for reasons beyond mere self-interest,
seeking instead "the public satisfactions of meaningful public action, historic
immortality, and social interconnection." 75 Other works explain constitutional
change by focusing on the role of identity-based social movements in the latter
half of the twentieth century76 or the concept of "popular sovereignty" in

69. Siegel, supra note 17, at 300.
70. Id. at 309, 324.
71. Id. at 307-13; see also Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1980-2020 (discussing the Family
Medical Leave Act).
72. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 2001 (footnote omitted).
73. Siegel, supra note 17, at 311.
74. Pope, Labor's Constitution, supra note 22, at 944.
75. Id. at 991.
76. William Eskridge, for example, describes a process of modern-day constitutional change in
which constitutional norms are a direct function of the political progress made by a minority group. As
twentieth century identity-based social movements (IBSMs) gained cohesion, political influence, and
increased tolerance through social-movement organizing, the Court became more responsive to the
factual narratives and innovative doctrinal theories that IBSMs offered in the courtroom. The relationship between the IBSMs and the Court proved to be mutually beneficial. New IBSMs, observing the
political progress of their predecessors, focused their efforts on the Court. See generally Eskridge,
Effects, supra note 18 (focusing on evolution of constitutional norms governing classifications based on
race, sex, and sexual orientation). The Court, in turn, has gained "worldwide acclaim and admiration,
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pre-Revolutionary conceptions of constitutional law. 77
On the normative front, popular constitutionalism produces at least two
purported benefits: enhanced legitimacy and a greater capacity for ongoing
self-definition. 78 First, according to Post and Siegel, it generates greater "fidelity to constitutional values."79 The People "expect their own constitutional
beliefs to matter," 80 and the Constitution sustains its "legitimacy and authority"81 by incorporating "the quintessentially democratic attitude in which citizens know themselves as authorities, as authors of their own law." 82
Second, popular constitutionalism advances a distinctive vision of the Constitution's role in developing a contemporary national identity. The Constitution
calls "into being a regime of republican self-government" 83 in which "constitutional understandings and commitments can be challenged, reinterpreted, and
renewed." 84 Rather than undermining a series of precommitments to core
values, the intersection of law and politics within the interpretive process allows
the Constitution to serve as "an expression of [our] deepest beliefs and convictions," and a reflection of the current "political self-conception of the nation." 85
Within this broad normative framework, popular constitutionalists are far
from a monolithic force, 86 and their work reflects a major descriptive rift in
present-day constitutional interpretation over the division of interpretive power
between t.lie People and the Court. One camp-Lhe "policentrists"87-see the

enhanced its legitimacy, and increased its power in our polity." Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 18, at
505.
77. In Kramer's account, the People offered interpretations about the constitutionality of state action
through petitioning, protests, voting, "mobbing," and popular pressure on local law enforcement
authorities. While these actions predate the adoption of the Constitution, Kramer argues that preRevolutionary constitutionalism was based on a "customary constitution" that was based upon the
consent of the governed and had its origins in English legal culture and practice. See Kramer, We the
Court, supra note 16, at 16-33. Further, Kramer sees popular constitutionalism as entirely consistent
with constitutional law's traditional status as "a special form of popular law" that is fundamentally
different from statutory or common law. See id. at 10.
78. I acknowledge here that, for constitutional theorists, the divide between descriptive and normative argument is often difficult, if not impossible, to discern. See Barry Friedman, The CounterMajoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 933, 934
(2001). What follows is an attempt to dissect these elements from a body of literature that is often less
than explicit about distinguishing between descriptive observations and normative assertions.
79. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1983.
80. Id. at 1982.
81. Id. at 1952.
82. Id. at 1982.
83. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 165.
84. Id. at 15.
85. Post, supra note 14, at 36-37.
86. For efforts to describe the different strands of popular constitutionalist scholarship, see generally
KRAMER, POPULAR CoNSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 16; James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without
Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1377,
1378-80 (2005).
87. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1946. I use this term somewhat differently from Post and Siegel,
who use it to describe those espousing a model of Section Five power that "attributes equal interpretive
authority to both the Congress and to the Court." Id.
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Rehnquist Court as a poor autobiographer, its perspective skewed by the failure
to acknowledge both the historic interrelationship between law and politics and
the role of popular mobilizations in the development of constitutional law. For
policentrists, the nation is awash in popular interpretive preferences advanced
through a range of political activity, with American constitutional discourse
emerging as a vibrant and multi voiced contact sport. 88 The Court finds itself
immersed in a cacophonous mass of popular and institutional interpretive
expression, where constitutional meanings are contested and redefined in a
conversation that involves the Court and many other players. 89 This input is
then "incorporated into the warp and woof of constitutional law,"90 as political
institutions-including the Court-act in ways that show their popular accountability.
Post, for example, describes the Court's 2002-03 term as deeply intertwined
with the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors. In recent decisions upholding
affirmative action and overturning state sodomy laws, "the Court has shaped the
substance of constitutional law to meet the demands of a dialectical relationship
to constitutional culture." 91 Specifically, he portrays the Court's recent sodomy
decision in Lawrence as an "opening bid" in a larger dialogue between the
Court and the People about the constitutional status of gay people, with the
Court giving itself room to respond to the larger political consequences of its
decision. 92
The second camp--the "juridominants"--desire an increased role for the
People, but are somewhat more skeptical about the role of extrajudicial interpretation in contemporary America. They view judicial supremacy as a largely
accepted, if normatively flawed, 93 premise, and see the Rehnquist Court's
"power grab" for supremacy as the historical apex of judicial power. 94 As
Kramer and others note, most Americans believe that the Court has the final say
in what the Constitution means. 95 Judicial power receives reinforcement from
numerous sources, including the popular media, 96 a public that takes the Court's

88. See Powe, supra note 29, at 866-83 (outlining seven examples of postwar popular constitutionalism, and concluding that "popular constitutionalism appears to be alive and well").
89. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 653-54 (1993).
Robert Cover describes courts as performing a "jurispathic" function, suppressing multiple interpretive
visions that arise out of a process of "jurisgenesis." See Cover, supra note 9, at 11, 40-44.
90. Post, supra note 14, at 8.
91. Id. at 105.
92. Id. at 104.
93. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 15, at 257--66.
94. See Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 168.
95. MICHAEL x. DELLI CARPINI & Scorr KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNow ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT
MATTERS 72 (1996); KRAMER, supra note 13, at 232; Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2596, 2621 (2003); Samuel L. Popkin & Michael A. Dimock, Political
Knowledge and Citizen Competence, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 117, 126
(Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1999) (presenting 1994 study finding that 67.3% of
people think the Supreme Court has "the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not").
96. Whittington, supra note 20, at 777 n.20.
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supreme interpretive authority for granted, 97 and a legal-academic culture that
inculcates the narrative in future generations of political elites. 98 Academic
specialization helps too, by keeping political scientists and legal scholars operating in relative isolation. 99
From this vantage point, the People's interpretive aspirations are sublimated
by a cultural consensus about the Court's departmental role. And in response,
critics, whether driven by a normative agenda or by outright frustration with the
Court's current composition, 100 have developed various schemes to challenge
judicial supremacy, either through structural change, overt extrajudicial challenges to existing constitutional norms, 101 or the elimination of judicial review.102
Both camps leave a series of critical questions about the People's interpretive
role unanswered. For example, popular constitutionalists are-almost to a
person-completely silent about what their theories demand from individual
citizens in order to operate effectively. Does popular constitutionalism need, for
example, a certain level of political participation in order to legitimize interpretive preferences or promote a national conversation about constitutional values?
Are present levels of participation sufficient to achieve these normative goals,
and if so, how can we tell? Should we care whether the participants accurately
represent the entire polity? Does the theory require citizens to attain some
minimum level of constitutional expertise to develop meaningful interpretive
preferences? And, if so, what does a citizen need to be knowledgeable about?
The constitutional text? The actions of their elected representatives? The Supreme Court? Do interpretive acts by popularly accountable branches actually
confer greater legitimacy?
Political scientists spend a lot of time worrying about these sorts of questions,
and their findings present challenges for both camps. For juridominant scholars
who seek a greater role for the People in interpretive discourse, apathy and
ignorance present concrete obstacles to aspirations for greater popular involvement in constitutional culture. For the policentrists, the People's perceptions
about democratic institutions and processes call into question popular constitu-

97. Id. at 777 n.21.
98. Id. at 777. As Barry Friedman recounts, academic "obsession" with judging and judicial review
is a pathology that derives from now-distant historical events. The dialogue began during the Progressive Era, when the Court's efforts to strike down popular economic legislation raised concerns about the
countermajoritarian nature of judicial review. Generations of academic inculcation have kept the eyes
of constitutional scholars focused squarely on the courts, despite the massive expansion of executive
power, the growth of the administrative state, the rise of social movements, and a host of other
historical trends that had the potential to reframe--or at least expand-the institutional focus of
constitutional theory. See Friedman, History, Part Five, supra note 40, at 156.
99. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1314 (2002) (noting lack of
interdisciplinary work in constitutional scholarship).
JOO. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL.
L. REv. 1013, 1023 (2004).
IOI. See KRAMER, supra note 13, at 249.
102. See generally TusHNET, supra note 23.
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tionalism's ability to confer legitimacy on interpretive outcomes. Finally, from a
descriptive perspective, popular constitutionalism often operates in ways that
enhance the role of nonjudicial elites in the interpretive process, rather than
incorporating the voice of individual citizens.
II. NOSTALGIA AND THE GENERATIONAL DIVIDE

It is hard not to admire policentric visions of American political life. In this
alternate universe, civic engagement is high, social movements motivate a
larger evolution of constitutional values, and political institutions respond to
mobilization around constitutional issues. Juridominant aspirations also have
significant appeal. In this hypothetical world, the People and their political
institutions are empowered to challenge concentrations of interpretive power,
and accept greater responsibility for resolving core disputes about constitutional
meaning. Indeed, it is easy to see how constitutional scholars whose politically
formative years occurred amidst the progressive social activism of the 1960s
and 1970s would tell these stories and revere their protagonists. 103
Yet this is not the America I k:now. 104
To children of the post-Watergate era whose formative years occurred amidst
widespread political apathy and ignorance, unprecedented amounts of money
entering the political process, and the political mobilization of the religious
right, popular constitutionalism seems nostalgic: "A collective dream that facilitates a primitive exchange of sentiments, while inhibiting a realistic appraisal of
contemporary social relations." 105
In reading the popular constitutionalists' work, I am drawn back to a conversation with my grandmother many years ago, listening to her describe a baseball
game at Ebbett's Field in Brooklyn. Her vision is idyllic: it's a day game, the
sky is blue, and the grass is perfectly groomed. The park itself is intimate, and
there is a strong sense of spirit and community among the fans. In her
recollection, the players exhibit a childlike love of the game, almost glowing in
an aura of innocence. Her story is rich with history and emotion, a testimonial
to a finer and more intimate time.
Looking back now, her vision-real or imagined-might as well have occurred on another planet. The games I attend are still fun, but somehow more
complex and tarnished. Words like free agency and salary cap and steroids are
103. See, e.g., M. Kent Jennings, Residues of a Movement: The Aging of the American Protest
Generation, 81 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 367, 381 (1987) ("Among more politicized, passionate, and skillful
sub-populations ... the residues of the formative experience may be strong indeed.").
104. I recognize it is somewhat unusual to insert a personal perspective into a theoretical piece.
Here, however, I take to heart Jack Balkin's admonition that constitutional theory-at least for the
constitutional theorist-begins at home. See Balkin, supra note 36, at 1952. Subjective factors and
contextual dynamics in the theorist's life can and do influence the critic's perspective.
105. Fabio B. DaSilva & Jim Faught, Nostalgia: A Sphere and Process of Contemporary Ideology, 5
QUALITATIVE Soc. 47, 49 (1982). While the term nostalgia was originally used to describe homesickness, today it connotes "a longing for something far away and long ago." David S. Werman, Nonna/
and Pathological Nostalgia, 25 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC Ass'N 387, 387-88 (1977).
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on people's lips, and many fans are on the road by the seventh inning to beat the
traffic. While her story says a lot about history and aspiration, it says very little
about either the game today or my experience at the ballpark, other than a
lingering sense of longing for a golden age long past.
In time, nostalgia must give way to reality. While constitutional theorists
have looked to the past by focusing on historical moments of popular mobilization, 106 contemporary political scientists have been amassing data about how
the American people perceive their government, their sense of civic responsibility, and their own capacity for self-governance.
Their work presents a pessimistic vision for popular engagement in constitutional interpretation, with a polity that bears only a distant relationship to the
images of vibrant civic life that animate policentrist narratives. Far from
prepared for the massive shift in interpretive responsibility that popular constitutionalism entails, Americans are seen as increasingly turned off by politics and
disengaged from civic life. Hence, the political scientists' work presents descriptive challenges to policentric accounts of the People's relationship with politics,
and operational challenges to juridominant calls for a popular constitutionalist
regime to counteract the Court's interpretive supremacy.
Popular constitutionalism's central theoretical premise is that citizens play an
active role in the day-to-day business of constitutional interpretation outside of
Article V. This occurs along two channels of communication. The first is
through cultural expression and engagement. 107 A citizen who, for example,
watches Will and Grace is a participant in a larger conversation about the legal
status of lesbians and gay men in contemporary society. This dialogue engages
constitutional culture by sending signals about social tolerance, stigma, equality,
and other dynamics that contribute to the establishment and maintenance of
constitutional norms. Its full exploration, however, is beyond our scope.
The second, and primary, means for accessing constitutional culture is through
traditional political channels. The citizen who sends messages along these
participatory pathways becomes a "citizen-interpreter" whose perspective is
integrated into the interpretive process.
The citizen-interpreter engages the conversation about constitutional meaning
in three distinct steps: preferences, participation, and legitimacy. For a citizen to
engage with constitutional culture, she must first obtain information about, and
then discern her preferences on, a given constitutional issue. Those preferences
are, in tum, delivered into constitutional culture through one or more acts of
political participation. Finally, the citizen-interpreter grants legitimacy through
compliance with constitutional norms.
For years, political scientists have been exploring all three areas, and their

106. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
107. Post, supra note 14, at 8-9 (distinguishing between culture and constitutional culture). But see
Balkin, supra note 36, at 1947-48 (suggesting that the distinction between "popular culture" and
"democratic culture" is dependent upon the theorist's perspective).
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work presents some large pragmatic hurdles for popular constitutionalism. But
empiricism, like any analytical lens, has its limitations. Questions of sample
size, the phrasing of survey questions, data analysis, and methodology come
with the territory. In reviewing the relevant literature, I do not mean to suggest
that these snapshots reflect a perfectly accurate vision of contemporary American political life, or that the studies themselves are flawless. Instead, I am using
their work to raise practical questions about both the feasibility and normative
benefits of popular constitutionalism in contemporary America.
Ill.

APATHY AND IGNORANCE, OR, WHAT IF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISTS THREW
A REVOLUTION AND NOBODY CARED?

Juridominants ask the People-either directly or through their representatives-to initiate a new interpretive regime that directly challenges existing
assumptions about the Court's role in defining constitutional meaning. As
Kramer puts it, "[i]t means insisting that the Supreme Court is our servant and
not our master: a servant whose seriousness and knowledge deserves much
deference, but who is ultimately supposed to yield to our judgments about what
the Constitution means and not the reverse." 108 Along with spawning a revolution in interpretive responsibility, the People and their elected representatives
are asked to assume a new role in the interpretive process, one that requires a
more active engagement with constitutional law and politics. 109
Yet this collides with studies showing that the People have little interest in
increased civic responsibility or greater popular accountability in politics. 110 In
a recent book, political scientists John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse
sought to document Americans' perceptions and feelings about their involvement in the political process. They concluded that "[t]he last thing people want
is to be more involved in political decisionmaking: They do not want to make
political decisions themselves; they do not want to provide much input to those
who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know all
the details of the decision-making process." 111
Their conclusions are backed up by numerous studies about political participation and knowledge that portray current political conditions as particularly
inhospitable to a juridominant revolution in interpretive responsibility. If participation levels are any indication, exercising their interpretive influence is, at
present, very low on the People's "to-do" list. And if levels of political
knowledge are any indication, the People appear content to allow constitutional
interpretation to exist largely off their radar screen. Moreover, these trends are

108. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 248.
109. See id. at 247-48; TusHNET, supra note 23, at 57-65 (suggesting that Congress's interpretive
role is limited by the Court's interpretive dominance).
110. The same might be said of Congress. See KRAMER, supra note 13, at 228.
111. JoHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT
How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 1-2 (2002).
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prevalent in contemporary American politics, and generational data suggest that
they will remain in place for a long time to come.
A. PARTICIPATION

For the citizen-interpreter, political participation is the primary vehicle for
accessing the communicative pathways across the law-politics divide. 112 Citizens send interpretive messages into constitutional culture through a range of
electoral and political acts, creating a dynamic system where participant demographics, methods of communication, levels of civic engagement, and responsiveness of political institutions to participatory input change over time. 113
As the most common form of political participation, 114 voting plays a significant role in any popular constitutionalist scheme. When interpretive power
shifts from the exclusive province of the Court to political institutions that
possess greater popular accountability, voting becomes the primary-though by
no means the exclusive-vehicle for communicating popular interpretive preferences.
Today, America is in the midst of a five-decade-long decline in voter turnout. 115 According to the Federal Election Commission, 63% of eligible voters
cast a ballot in the 1960 presidential election. 116 By 2000-a closely contested
election-the turnout percentage had fallen to 51 %. 117 The decline in nonpresidential elections is equally stark, with 47% turnout in 1962 118 falling to 36% in
1998. 119 While there was a slight resurgence in interest during the mid-eighties
and a major upsurge in turnout for the 2004 election, 120 the overall trend is
stark: participation in Presidential elections has decreased by one-quarter over
the past forty years, with roughly the same decline for off-year elections. 121 The
decline extends to state and local elections. One study reported a 26% decrease

112. I adopt here M. Margaret Conway's definition of political participation as "activities of citizens
that attempt to influence the structure of government, the selection of government officials, or the
policies of government." M. MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN TIIE UNITED STATES 3 (3d
ed. 2000).
113. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at ch. 9; CONWAY, supra note 112, at 6-12.
114. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 50.
115. But see Michael P. McDonald & Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of the Vanishing Voter, 95 AM.
PoL. Sci. REv. 963, 963 (2001) (arguing that apparent decline in voter participation is an illusion created
by using the "voting age population" instead of eligible voters to determine turnout rate).
116. Federal Election Commission, National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-1996, available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
117. Federal Election Commission, Voter Registration and Turnout 2000, available at http://
www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
118. Federal Election Commission, supra note 116.
119. Federal Election Commission, Voter Registration and Turnout-1998, available at http://
www.fec.gov/pages/reg&to98.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
120. See Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, President Bush, Mobilization Drives
Propel Turnout to Post-1968 High; Kerry, Democratic Weakness Shown, at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/37992.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2005) (estimating a turnout of 59.6% of eligible voters). It
remains to be seen whether the increase was a one-time event or indicative of a larger trend.
121. PuTNAM, supra note 26, at 32.
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between 1967 and 1987 in the number of people who say they "always vote in
local elections." 122
When compared both with other periods in American history and with other
democracies, contemporary turnout is low. Between 1840 and 1900, for example, turnout averaged 77.7%. 123 Reviewing the 1996 and 1998 elections,
Robert Putnam concluded that it had been nearly two centuries "since so many
American citizens freely abstained from voting." 124 Further, when compared
with twenty other democracies, the United States ranks next to last (ahead of
Switzerland), with the highest-ranked democracies (Belgium, Austria, and Australia) sporting turnouts of 90% or more. 125
The decline in electoral turnout has occurred despite tremendous strides in
three areas that should have helped reverse the trend: increased access to
education, decreased information costs, and the elimination of barriers to voter
registration.
Education is a strong predictor of electoral participation: well-educated people
are more likely to be interested and well informed about politics 126 and more
likely to cast a ballot. 127 As a result, one would expect that increased access to
institutions of higher education would bring an increase in voter interest and
activism. Instead, just the opposite has occurred. Despite increased levels of
educational attainment, 128 electoral turnout continues to decline. 129
Moreover, political scientists have long speculated that the costs of obtaining
and analyzing political information contribute to voter disengagement. 130 The
decision to vote involves an assessment of costs and benefits, both tangible and
intangible. Among the significant costs voters take on is an investment of time
and energy in obtaining and analyzing information about the candidates or the
pressing issues of the day. While developments in information technology,
marketing, and mass manufacturing have made information easier to come by,
better targeted, and cheaper to obtain than ever before, these changes seem not
to have affected the American electorate.
Finally, access to the polls has never been greater. Since the 1960s, changes
in voter registration systems have enhanced access to the franchise, including
the abolition of poll taxes and literacy tests, the increased availability of

122. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN, & BRADY, supra note 26, at 72.
123. RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 8 (1992).
124. PuTNAM, supra note 26, at 33.
125. Id. at 7; see also Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma, 91
AM. PoL. Sc1. REv. 1, 5 (1997) ("[T]he United States ranks near the bottom of voting participation in
comparative perspective .... ").
126. RAYMONDE. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VoTES? 19 tbl.2.2 (1980).
127. NORMAN H. NIE, JANE JUNN & KENNETH STEHLIK-BARRY, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRATIC CmZENSHIP
IN AMERICA 31 (1996).
128. Id. at 114-15.
129. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 74.
130. See, e.g., The Process of Becoming lnfonned, ch. 11 of ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY ( 1957).
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multilingual materials, the decline in state residency requirements, and the
creation of national standards for absentee registration. 131 Yet, while the Federal
Election Commission estimates that the Motor Voter Act has added at least ten
million registered voters to the rolls since 1993, turnout dropped by five million
between 1992 and 2000. 132
Voting is, of course, only one type of participation. The People assert their
interpretive preferences through numerous other mechanisms, including work
on political campaigns, writing letters to elected officials, donating money to
campaigns or causes, running for public office, protesting, attending town
meetings, or joining organizations that advance a particular viewpoint or agenda.
These other types of participation are particularly critical for citizeninterpreters who seek to influence constitutional culture. First, they are "information-rich" activities. 133 While it is difficult to use one's vote to send a specific
message beyond a preference for one candidate over another, other forms of
participation allow a participant to target a specific interpretive message to a
specific institutional or popular audience. 134 Second, these other activities allow
participants to express the intensity of their preference, and to enjoy the
increased responsiveness that comes from a greater volume of participation. 135
While a voter can only vote once, the resources a motivated individual can give
to other participatory activities are relatively unconstrained. Compared with
other forms of participation, voting is "a rather blunt instrument for the communication of information about the needs and preferences of citizens." 136
Robert Putnam, reviewing monthly polling results from 1973 to 1994 involving 410,000 respondents, found an across-the-board decline in almost every
form of political participation. 137 In the 1990s, Americans were about half as
likely to work for a political party or attend a political rally as they were in the
1970s. 138 Over the period of the survey, the number of office seekers declined
by 15%, and attendance at public meetings on town or school affairs declined
by 40%. Putnam also reported significant decreases in the number of people
who report signing a petition or writing a letter to Congress, 139 and a one-third
increase in the number of Americans who do not engage in any form of civic

131. TEIXEIRA, supra note 123, at 29.
132. THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: Pueuc INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 8
(2002).
133. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN, & BRADY, supra note 26, at 169.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. PuTNAM, supra note 26, at 420.
138. Id. at 41.
139. Id. at 45 tbl. l (noting a 23% decline in writing a letter to Congress and a 22% decline in
signing a petition); see also RosENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 63 (reporting a decline in
Congressional letter writing between 1973 and 1990). But see VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note
26, at 73 (reporting increase in Congressional mail). See PumAM, supra note 26, at 449 nn.29-30 for an
explanation of the discrepancy.
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participation. 140
Not surprisingly, interest in politics has declined alongside participation.
National surveys reflect that the number of Americans who reported discussing
politics "within the last week" fell from 51 % in 1980 to 28% in 1996, 14 I and the
number who assert that they are "interested in politics" fell from 52% in 1975 to
42% in 1999. 142 The number reporting a "good deal of interest" in current
events fell from 50% in 1974 to 38% in 1998. I 43 Political conversations among
high school students were about half as common in the late 1990s as they were
thirty years earlier. 144
While there is no shortage of explanations for participatory decline, 145 there
is a significant body of evidence pointing to "generational replacement"-the
replacement of engaged older citizens by younger, more apathetic citizens-as a
primary factor. I 46 This "generation gap in civic engagement," driven by the
increased role of baby boomers and their children, has driven turnout steadily
downward. I 47 Civic disengagement is concentrated in younger age cohorts, who
are far less likely to write to members of Congress, sign petitions, work for
political parties, or engage in any civic activity than their parents were at the
same age. I 48 This presents major challenges for reversing current trends, as
younger cohorts begin to dominate the pool of eligible civic participants.
B. KNOWLEDGE

Time and attention are limited resources. As a result, citizens must make
deliberate choices about what to focus on and gather information about. I 49 In

140. PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 44.
141. Id. at448 n.13.
142. Id. The data are derived from the DOB Needham Life Style survey, conducted every year from
1975 with an annual sample of 3500-4500. Id. at 420.
143. Id. at 448 n.13. The data are derived from the Roper organization, which conducted an annual
survey from September 1973 to October 1994 with approximately 2000 voting-age participants a year.
Id. at 420.
144. Id. at 260.
145. The research in this area reaches a wide range of conclusions. See, e.g., DowNs, supra note 130,
tbl.4.2 (rational voter behavior); FRANCES Fox PlVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T
VOTE 260 (1988) (restrictive voter registration Jaws); PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 260 (declin.ing social
connectedness); RosENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26 at 162 (declining role of political parties in
mobilizing voters); VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 129 (presenting a diverse list of
reasons given in response to a survey, with "not enough time" and "taking care of myself and family"
both polling slightly over one-third of respondents); Paul R. Abramson & John H. Aldrich, The Decline
of Electoral Panicipation in the United States, 76 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 502-21 (1982) (weakening party
affiliations and a declining sense of government responsiveness); Popkin & Dimock, supra note 95, at
142 (lack of political knowledge).
146. WARREN E. MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW AMERICAN VOTER 69 (1996).
147. PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 34.
148. Id. at 252; see also William A. Galston, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic
Education, 4 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 217, 219 (2001) (revealing that in early 1970s, about half of
18-to-29-year-olds voted in presidential elections, compared with fewer than one-third in 1996).
149. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN
WHAT THEY NEED To KNOW? 22 ( 1998).
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the highly competitive market for our awareness, politics generally, and constitutional law specifically, occupies an extremely limited place in our collective
consciousness.
General political knowledge exists along a continuum, with a "high variance
in political awareness around a generally low mean." 150 At one end is a small
but influential minority of well-informed citizens who are highly engaged with
the political process. 151 At the other end is a much larger minority of "know
nothings." 152 Ilya Somin, analyzing National Election Study data collected
during the 2000 Presidential election, recently found that somewhere between
25% and 35% of Americans have virtually no political knowledge at all. 153
Most Americans fall in between the two extremes, but even within this
middle group average knowledge levels are quite low. Somin concluded, echoing numerous previous studies, 154 that Americans possess a low level of basic
political knowledge. 155 For example, only 15% were able to successfully name
at least one candidate for the House of Representatives in their own district, and
only 11 % were able to identify the post held by William Rehnquist. 156 On
political issues with constitutional implications, voters were operating on shaky
ground: only 46% of respondents knew that Gore was more supportive of
abortion rights than Bush, and only 51 % identified Gore as more supportive of
gun control. 157
Moreover, in a disturbing sign for the future, 158 political ignorance is growing
among younger age cohorts: comparing voter knowledge in survey data from
1989 with Gallup polls from the 1940s and 1950s, Delli Carpini and Keeter
found that the knowledge gap between 18-to-29-year-olds and older cohorts is
"substantially greater" now than it was then. 159 According to Putnam, about half
150. foHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 18 (1992).
151. Id. at 16; Stephen Earl Bennett, "Know-Nothings" Revisited: The Meaning of Political
Ignorance Today, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 476, 482 (1988). There is a strong correlation between political
knowledge and participation. In the 1988 presidential election, for example, among the most knowledgeable ten percent in Delli Carpini and Keeter's surveys, nine out of ten voted. By contrast, among the
least informed ten percent, only two in ten went to the polls. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at
224.
152. Bennett, supra note 151, at 482.
153. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on
the "Central Obsession" of Constitutional Theory, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1287, 1313 (2004).
154. See, e.g., DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 62-104 (reviewing studies on Americans'
low level of political knowledge); ZALLER, supra note 150, at 18 (same); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance
and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REv. 413, 416-20 (1998) (same).
155. Somin, supra note 153, at 1308 tbl.l. Somin analyzes data collected during the 2000 National
Election Study. His survey items focus on different types of political knowledge, including specific
policy issues, positions taken by major candidates, and facts about major political figures. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See M. Kent Jennings, Political Knowledge over Time and Across Generations, 60 PUB. OPINION
Q. 228, 249 (1996) (concluding that political knowledge among a particular age cohort remains stable
over time across the life cycle).
159. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 172. The data are derived from the 1989 Survey of
Political Knowledge, which involved telephone interviews with 610 randomly selected adults. The
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as many college freshmen as thirty years ago describe themselves as keeping up
to date with politics. 160
While popular constitutionalists have remained largely silent on the minimum
level of knowledge needed to meaningfully participate in constitutional culture,
the bar must, by necessity, be quite low. While there is a lack of current data on
basic constitutional literacy, Delli Carpini and Keeter culled data from a range
of more general national surveys conducted between 1940 and 1994.
The results, limited as they are, vary based on the level of generality. On the
positive side, a large majority of survey participants in the mid-l 980s knew that
the Constitution was subject to amendment, that it contained a right to a trial by
jury, that states could institute the death penalty, and that the First Amendment
protected rights related to free speech and the press. 161 Further, younger age
cohorts appeared more knowledgeable about constitutional issues than older
ones. 162
But as the questions became more detailed, constitutional literacy predictably
declined. Just over half were able to identify the number of women on the
Supreme Court. 163 Between a quarter and a half of people asked could describe
the decisions reached in three highly salient decisions: Miranda v. Arizona, Roe
v. Wade, and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 164 Less than one-quarter
were able to identify more than one right protected by the First or Fifth
Amendments, could name all three branches of government, or knew that the
Supreme Court did not automatically review all federal lower-court decisions.165
Even in moments when public attention is focused on interpretive developments, constitutional culture operates on the fringes of popular consciousness.166 In a study conducted after the Court issued a major 1989 abortion
decision, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, only about 50% of the public
knew anything about the decision, declining to 35% several weeks after the

pollsters asked questions substantially similar to those asked during Gallup polls in the 1940s and
1950s.ld.at 163,291-93.
160. PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 260.
161. The surveys revealed that 76% knew the constitution could be amended (1986), 83% knew the
right to a jury trial was guaranteed (1986), 83% knew the states could institute the death penalty (1983),
and 75% correctly identified the First Amendment rights. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at
70-71.
162. Id. at 203.
163. In 1988, 53% of survey participants answered this question correctly. Id. at 70.
164. Forty-five percent of survey participants identified the substance of the Miranda decision
(1989), 30% identified Roe (1986), and 29% identified Webster (1989). Id. See Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
165. Only 20% were able to name two First Amendment rights, and only 2% two Fifth Amendment
rights (1989). Id. at 71. Only 12% knew that the Supreme Court did not review all federal cases (1986),
and 19% were able to name the three branches of government ( 1952). Id. at 71.
166. See Friedman, supra note 95, at 2623 ("Only a small fraction of the Supreme Court's work is
likely to be salient with the public.").
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decision. 167 Webster, though, is aberrational in its ability to command comparatively high levels of public attention. 168 In general, large segments of the public
are essentially ignorant about the Court and its work. 169 This is no surprise,
given that the Court enjoys significantly less media coverage than other branches
of government, 170 and what is reported omits much of what the Court does. 171
In sum, current levels of knowledge and participation suggest, as Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse put it, that "the people's desire to avoid politics is widespread." 172
Large numbers of Americans deliberately opt out of the process, choosing to
spend their time on other pursuits. If popular constitutionalists intend to place
increased civic responsibility in the hands of individual citizens-either to
initiate a shift toward greater popular accountability or to actively integrate their
preferences into the interpretive process-they must reckon with the fact that
the People seem to want less, not more, involvement in civic life. These are
sub-optimal conditions for juridominant scholars seeking to launch an interpretive revolution, particularly if the People are expected to play an active role in
provoking a change in interpretive regimes.
Indeed, in such an environment, the People are likely to prefer interpretive
processes that make minimal demands on their time and attention. Judicial
supremacy, in turn, begins to look increasingly attractive to the average Joe.
Under a juricentric regime, the People avoid the increased transaction costs that
come with greater control over interpretive outcomes: obtaining and analyzing
interpretive information, prioritizing and communicating preferences, monitor-

167. ZALLER, supra note 150, at 17-18.
168. Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the
Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352, 364, 366 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
169. See id. at 369; see also Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of
Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. PoL. Ser. REV. 1209, 1211 (1986) ("Few members of
the public, regardless of the place or time of the sample, fulfill the most minimal prerequisites of the
role of a knowledgeable and competent citizen vis-a-vis the Court."). But see Valerie J. Hoekstra, The
Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 89, 90, 97 (2000) (criticizing
methodology of surveys examining public knowledge about the Court); James L. Gibson, Gregory A.
Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Public Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 2001, at 4 (2001)
(unpublished manuscript) available at http://artsci.wustl.edu/-Iegit/Courtknowledge.pdf (last visited
Nov. 23, 2004) (concluding that Americans have a "surprisingly high" level of information about the
Court, based on surveys conducted after the 2000 election controversy).
170. See Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 168, at 357 (finding that the President and Congress receive,
respectively, 8.3 and 4.1 times as much coverage as the Court). But see Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact
of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 38
(2001) (finding "clear" but "not dramatic" increases in knowledge about the Court due to heightened
media coverage around Bush v. Gore).
Knowledge about the Court and its workings is, of course, distinct from knowledge about constitutional values, constitutional procedures, or other aspects of constitutional discourse. However, for the
majority of Americans, who assume the Court's interpretive supremacy, see supra note 95, knowledge
of the Court and of the Constitution are often one and the same.
171. Jerome O'Callaghan & James 0. Dukes, Media Coverage of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 69
JoURNALISM Q. 195, 203 (1992) (concluding that "the media frequently neglect the Court's contribution
to the development of many diverse areas of American law") .
. 172. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 111, at 3.
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ing political agents to ensure that their behavior complies with desired outcomes, and the psycho-emotional costs of bringing constitutional issues,
previously addressed within the highly circumscribed rules of the courtroom,
into a more overtly contentious political context.
Instead, unelected judges incur the costs of obtaining information, determining its relevance, analyzing it, developing a conclusion, and implementing an
interpretive vision. Court hierarchies and the appointments process absorb the
agency costs of monitoring interpretive developments. And, with limited opportunity for interpretive input, the People are free to allocate their time and energy
to other pursuits.
IV. POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

The Court's recent assertion of interpretive power has caused significant
distress among popular constitutionalists; they have not been shy about calling
on the People and other political institutions to take action. 173 Yet the Court's
"grab for power" 174 may reflect a broader consensus about how our society
should resolve interpretive problems. This consensus de-emphasizes the voice
of ordinary people in favor of processes and institutional actors that maintain an
appearance of neutrality and eschew overt conflict.
Policentrists posit an interpretive process where norms are reached through
multiple actors and a mixture of political and legal procedures. The process
results in interpretive outcomes that are "grounded in the constitutional culture
of the nation," which is, in tum, "essential to constitutional legitimacy." 175
While policentrists avoid specifics about what their models demand from
individual citizens, they implicitly address concerns about low levels of civic
engagement through representative delegation, often treating Congress or interest groups as tantamount to "the People." Post and Siegel, for example, offer a
"legislative constitutionalism" model, where Congress serves as the primary
(but not exclusive) vehicle for communicating popular interpretive preferences,
often acting through Section Five legislation in response to social movements or
interest groups. 176 Democratic accountability thus allows Congress to "elicit
and articulate the nation's evolving interpretive aspirations," 177 which, in tum,
legitimizes interpretive outputs.
173. See KRAMER, supra note 13, at 247 ("[T]o control the Supreme Court, we must first lay claim to
the Constitution ourselves."); Post & Siegel, supra note 43, at 45 (telling Congress it "must act to
protect the Constitution for the people," which means publicly repudiating Justices who say that they
possess exclusive authority to say what the Constitution means).
174. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 169.
175. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 2059. While Post and Siegel do not offer any definition of
"legitimacy," I assume they are using the term in a positive sense, in which an interpretive regime "is
legitimate if people comply with its laws and cooperate in social undertakings as a matter of acceptance
rather than just of coerced obedience." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 207
(2003).
176. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 2026-32.
177. Id. at 2031.
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Yet there is little indication that the People have much faith in the ability of
Congress or interest groups to serve as their interpretive agents. In a 1998
Gallup survey, 67% of respondents felt interest groups had "[t]oo much power,"
outpolling even the federal government. 178 As for Congress, it consistently
enjoys much lower levels of public confidence and approval than either the
judiciary or the executive branch. 179 Large majorities perceive Congress as "too
heavily influenced by interest groups in making decisions," and "too far removed from ordinary people." 180
The Court, on the other hand, maintains comparatively high levels of public
support. 181 The reasons for favorable attitudes toward the Court are somewhat
unclear. Some legal scholars attribute it to the Court's adaptability and responsiveness to political trends and social movements; 182 others explain it by
pointing to the almost "mythic" qualities many Americans associate with the
institution. 183
Within political science, a recent and growing body of research points to
process, rather than outcomes, as the driving force behind the Court's relative
popularity. As Tom Tyler notes, "procedural justice influences are strong when
the focus of attention is citizen evaluations of national political and legal
authorities." 184
Tyler's research looked at the relative weight of different factors in assessing
the fairness of the Court's procedures. He concluded that assessments of
neutrality and the trustworthiness of the Justices' motives were major compo-

178. HIBBING & THEiss-MoRSE, supra note Ill, at 102. The poll involved a sample of 1266
respondents. Id. at 246.
179. Id. at 99; see also JoHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PuBLIC ENEMY 32
(1995) (documenting confidence levels from 1971-1994).
180. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 179, at 64.
181. Id. at 54; Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the
Supreme Coun, 36 AM. J. POL. Sc1. 635, 635 (1992) ("[T]he Supreme Court has traditionally fared well
in the estimations of the public, especially in comparison with other political institutions."); James L.
Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States
Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 354, 360 (2003); Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey,
The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. ll l 4, ll 18 (1997) (tracking support
from 1972-1994); Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., David J. Houston & Chris Sissie Hadjiharalambous,
Public Confidence in the Leaders of American Governmental Institutions, in WHAT Is IT ABOITT
GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 83, 83-84, 93-96 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse
eds., 2001); John M. Scheb & William Lyons, Public Perception of the Supreme Coun in the 1990s, 82
JUDICATURE 67 (1998) (finding respondents almost twice as likely to rate the Court "good" or
"excellent" than to similarly rate Congress); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the

Empowennent of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Coun and Abonion
Rights, 43 DuKE L.J. 703, 744 (1994).
182. See supra note 76.
183. See, e.g., Dean Jaros & Robert Roper, The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, Diffuse Support, Specific
Support, and Legitimacy, 8 AM. POL. Q. 85, 95 (1980) (finding "high degree of mythical belief about
the Supreme Court" among subjects attending state universities).
184. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Public Dissatisfaction with Government, in WHAT Is IT ABOITT
GovERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE?, supra note 181, at 227, 236.
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nents of the public's comparatively favorable view of the Court. I85 More
significantly for popular constitutionalists, he found that the public's inability to
influence the Court's decisions--0r lack of popular accountability-had "no
influence upon procedural fairness judgments."I 86
Tyler's findings reflect other studies that examine Americans' notions of
procedural justice and how they affect perceptions of political institutions.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue that public distaste for the prolonged and often
contentious deliberative processes that dominate legislative decisionmaking
schemes is a major factor in Congress's low public opinion ratings compared
with other political institutions. I87 This is consistent with social science research documenting the People's preference for avoiding conflict, and their
perception that animosity and public conflict violate shared social norms. I8 8
Moreover, there is significant ambivalence about processes such as compromise
and deliberation that are essential to the legislative process. Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse note a 1998 Gallup survey where 86% of respondents agreed that
"elected officials should stop talking and take action," and 60% agreed that
"compromise is selling out one's principles."I 89
In such a context, it is no surprise that the Court enjoys enhanced popular
legitimacy. I9 ° Compared with the heated and contentious rhetoric that often
accompanies national elections and Congressional debate, it operates as a model
of civility. Its decisionmaking procedures are highly circumscribed, with most
debate and horse trading taking place behind closed doors. Norms of professional courtesy and decorum are well established.
There are at least four other reasons to doubt the policentrist assertion that
"democratic accountability" necessarily produces more legitimate interpretive
outcomes. First, a significant segment of the population is skeptical about the
virtues of democratic accountability. In one recent survey, almost half of the
respondents agreed that the political system would be better if "decision making
were left to successful business people" or "non-elected experts."I 91 This
reflects, in part, the People's ambivalence about their own trustworthiness and
capacity for fairness, 192 as well as perceptions that elected officials use their
office to advance their own self-interest. I93 Juricentric interpretation, by contrast, appeals to the sizeable portion of Americans that favors a more expert-

185. Id. at 239.
186. Id.
187. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 179, at 147.
188. See Carolyn L. Funk, Process Performance: Public Reaction to Legislative Policy Debate, in
WHAT ls IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE?, supra note 181, at 193, 195, 198-201.
189. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 111, at 136.
190. See Friedman, supra note 95, at 2616-17.
191. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 111, at 139.
192. Id. at 113 (summarizing a 1998 Gallup survey showing 60% of respondents agreeing with
statement that "you can't be too careful in dealing with people" and 52% agreeing that "most people
would take advantage of you if they had the chance").
193. Id. at 122-24.
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driven approach to governance. Moreover, despite sometimes vehement
disagreement with interpretive outcomes, the Court's institutional support derives, in part, from a belief that the justices are not making decisions to advance
their own well-being. 194
Second, when it comes to constitutional interpretation, another body of data
suggests that the People show strong preferences toward the interpretive methodologies associated with judicial practice. Scheb and Lyons conclude that the
"myth of legality"-that judicial decisions are based upon neutral processes of
legal reasoning-is alive and well today. 195 The myth is particularly strong
among well-educated people-those most likely to participate in politics and
constitutional culture. 196 Furthermore, the language of law carries significant
symbolic weight. In examining popular expectations for the basis of Supreme
Court decisions, Scheb and Lyons found that people think original intent and
precedent should play prominent roles, while partisanship and ideology-on
relatively high display in the legislative arena-should have the least effect on
the Court's decisionmaking. 197
Third, to the extent that popular constitutionalism relies upon the involvement of non-judicial political elites, contemporary political conditions suggest
that their interpretive influence will move constitutional discourse in directions
that are anything but "popular." The political opinions of elites, by and large,
are significantly more polarized than the preferences of non-elite citizens. 198 If
past practice is any indication, increased interpretive input by political elites
will overrepresent the views of extreme ideologues, 199 and skew the interpretive
agenda towards issues of limited significance to most Americans. 200
Fourth, while popular constitutionalists often criticize other academics for
their lack of faith in the interpretive and political abilities of ordinary citizens,201 some of this skepticism is shared by the People themselves. Along with
a lack of desire, there are also indications that Americans are increasingly
skeptical of their own ability to participate in political life and effect political

194. Id. at 158.
195. John M. Scheb & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the Supreme
Court, 81 Soc. So. Q. 928, 928 (2000).
196. Id. at 938.
197. See John M. Scheb & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular
Expectations Regarding the Factors That Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 PoL. BEHAV. 181,
184-86 (2001).
198. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY c. POPE, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A
POLARIZED AMERICA 114-18 (2005).
199. Id. at 149-50.
200. Id. at 152-53.
201. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 13, at 244 ("Most contemporary commentators share a sensibility
that takes for granted various unflattering stereotypes respecting the irrationality and manipulability of
ordinary people ... ");PARKER, supra note 12, at 73 ("The conventional discourse of constitutional law
breathes in the warm air of the academy, rises over the heads of many to whom it is supposedly
addressed, and then sends down a subtle message of inadequacy to everyone who is not 'in the
know."').
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change. Political scientists measure an individual's sense of their own capacity
for self-governance by assessing their political efficacy. Efficacy comes in two
types: internal efficacy (a sense of one's personal ability to understand politics)
and external efficacy (a belief that one's political activities can influence
politics). 202 Efficacy is closely related to political participation, as individuals
with higher levels of efficacy are more likely to engage in a range of participatory activities, from voting to donating money. 203
Rosenstone and Hansen, examining data from 1952 to 1990, found that
Americans' sense of internal efficacy is declining. Between 1960 and 1988, the
percentage of the electorate who rejected the statement that "politics and
government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand
what's going on" fell from 41%to22%. 204
Their data reveal similar results for external efficacy. From 1960 to 1988, the
number of Americans who disagreed with the idea that "people like me don't
have any say in what the government does" fell from 73% to 55%. Over the
same period, the number who rejected the notion that public officials "don't ...
care much about what people like me think" fell from 75% to 43%. 205
These dynamics are only exacerbated when constitutional interpretation is the
participatory act in question. While there is little empirical data about Americans' beliefs in their own ability to interpret the Constitution or to affect others'
interpretations, we can guess that interpretive efficacy is in short supply. As
Richard Parker points out, the specialized and elitist nature of constitutional
discourse "has eroded the capacity of ordinary people to take part in . . . and
even understand" constitutional arguments. 206
The impact of this literature is twofold.
First, it adds to the body of data that portrays modern-day America as an
inhospitable environment for popular constitutionalist schemes. Indeed, many
citizens appear to prefer decisionmaking procedures that are relatively undemanding, minimize public deliberation, employ legal vocabulary and reasoning, and
are relatively insulated from the whim of public opinion.
Second, there is reason to doubt whether "democratic accountability" actually
enhances interpretive legitimacy. When asked to assess their own capacity to
govern or Congress's institutional performance, the People respond with skepticism. In this light, interpretive outcomes produced by judicial "experts," particularly when combined with perceptions that the process is fair2° 7 and insulated
202. RosENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 15.
203. Id. at 144-45.
204. Id. at 144.
205. Id. at 143-44.
206. PARKER, supra note 12, at 72-73.
207. See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 104-08, 178 (1990) (establishing a connection
between procedural justice, compliance, and legitimacy). But see James L. Gibson, Understandings of
Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & Soc'y REv.
469, 487 (1989) (arguing that compliance is based on notions of diffuse and specific support rather than
perceptions of fairness).
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from self-interest, may achieve greater legitimacy than an interpretive process
with greater popular accountability.
V.

POPULISM, REPRESENTATION, AND ELITE CONSTITUTIONALISM

When constitutional theorists talk about assigning interpretive responsibility,
they rely upon a distinction between two highly polarized "sensibilities." 208 On
one side is what Parker calls the Populist perspective, which embraces "energetic activity by ordinary people, and ... engagement with ordinary people, on
a common level." 209 Populists share a faith in an average citizen's ability to
engage constitutional issues, and believe that popular involvement "is good for
the vitality of all who take part in it, collectively as well as singly." 210 On the
other side is the "Anti-Populist" or "Progressive" perspective, which sees the
People as too impulsive and ill-informed to engage in basic self-governance
tasks. Anti-Populists prefer decisionmaking by calm, reasoned elites. 211
Popular constitutionalists associate judicial supremacy with Anti-Populism,
seeing it as driven by a fear of popular power and biased assumptions about the
People's capacity to govem. 212 They, in tum, assign themselves the Populist
label, and their narratives show the energy of ordinary people engaging constitutional culture. Kramer, for example, cites popular protests and riots against the
Jay Treaty, public meetings declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts null and void,
and a constitutionally salient jury nullification as examples of popular constitutionalism at the Founding. 213
Representative institutions are also filtered through the Populist lens. When
Congress acts, it is in response to or in conjunction with popular activism, with
legislators portrayed as agents of the People's interpretive will rather than
Burkean trustees who impose their own interpretive visions. 214 The People, in
tum, do more than choose between competing leadership slates in periodic
elections. 215 Through social movement activism, they serve as the point of
origin for and assessment of competing interpretive claims. In Post and Siegel's
account of the women's movement, for example, Congress acted to pass
constitutionally relevant legislation in response to a grassroots movement driven
by the conversations among and participation of ordinary women. 216
These populist narratives serve to advance one of popular constitutionalism's
208. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 241.
209. PARKER, supra note 12, at 62.
210. Id.
211. 'KRAMER, supra note 13, at 242.
212. Id. at 241-44.
213. Id. at 3-5.
214. For a description of Burke's theory of representation, see HIBBING & THE1ss-MoRSE, supra note
111, at 41.
215. This perspective on the People's role in democratic politics is often associated with Joseph
Schumpeter and his landmark work, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942). See POSNER, supra
note 175, at 178.
216. See Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1986-96.
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primary normative goals: to transform the Constitution from "a lawyer's contract" to "a layman's instrument of govemment" 217 through an interpretive
process where the People engage in a collective and ongoing redefinition of
national values. 218 In today's world, the People's increasingly distant relationship with political life leads constitutional culture to operate in ways that are
descriptively different from these moments of constitutional populism.
Consider, for example, how most Americans convey their interpretive preferences. Today, protesting is a comparatively rare event for most citizens. A 1990
survey of 2517 citizens found that only 6% had attended a protest within the
past two years. By contrast, 71 % of the survey participants reported voting in
the previous presidential election, and 24% reported donating money to a
campaign. 219
Indeed, campaign contributions-a participatory act all but ignored by popular constitutionalists-appear to be the mechanism of choice for those who want
to get their message heard. Today, a citizen who seeks to influence constitutional culture is far more likely to write a check than take to the streets. 220
While fewer and fewer Americans engage politics at a grassroots level (by
attending political meetings or working for a political party), checkbook participation has exploded, growing from $35 million in 1964 to over $700 million in
1996.221 Between 1967 and 1987, Verba, Scholzman and Brady found a 77%
increase in the number of Americans who reported contributing money to a
party or candidate. 222 Currently, somewhere between 4% and 12% of registered
voters donate money to federal campaigns. 223 Total spending on a single
campaign increased to an all-time high of $717 million in the 2004 presidential
election, more than ten times the $67 million spent in 1976. 224
Beyond the means of participation, limited participation and knowledge
affect contemporary constitutional culture in at least two significant ways. First,
low knowledge levels create an environment where the People's interpretive
217. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 248 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Constitution of the United
States Was a Layman's Document, Not a Lawyer's Contract, Address on Constitution Day, Washington
D.C. (Sept. 17, 1937), in l THE PuBuc PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 359, 362-63
(Samuel I. Rosenman compiler and collator, 1941)); Post & Siegel, supra note 43, at 26 (same).
218. See Balkin, supra note 36, at 1945-46 ("[P]opulism is based on a particular conception of
self-rule and self-determination, one in which the active participation of the citizenry-when they
choose to participate-is encouraged and facilitated.").
219. VERBA, ScttLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 50-51. Self-reporting of political activity is
often exaggerated in surveys. For an explanation, see id. at 50 n.2 and Somin, supra note 153, at
1313 n.113.
220. PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 39-40 ("Financial capital ... has steadily replaced social capital ...
as the coin of the realm.").
221. Id. at 39.
222. VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 72.
223. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYERS, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE
31 (2002).
224. Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Presidential Election, at http://www.opensecrets.org/
presidential/index.asp?graph=spending (last visited Nov. 24, 2004). These figures are not adjusted for
inflation.
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input is often unstable and highly malleable. Second, participation in constitutional culture is concentrated in ways that mirror larger power disparities in
American life.
The result is a constitutional conversation where the People's interpretive
voice is left in the hands of an unrepresentative group of fairly well-off and
well-educated citizens. This produces a constitutional culture that is highly
susceptible to influence by political elites, with the political energy of ordinary
people strategically channeled by elite opinion makers. 225
A. KNOWLEDGE, PUBLIC OPINION, AND ELITE DOMINATION

In his recent book, Kramer dismisses the notion that there is some minimum
level of moral or substantive expertise required for an individual citizen to
contribute to constitutional culture. Constitutional law involves "hard questions,
much too complicated to ever be solved or put to rest, regardless of the
interpretive actor." 226 Therefore, for example, knowledge about undue burdens,
pregnancy trimesters, or what the Court has said about privacy and substantive
due process are not prerequisites for the People to contribute meaningful
interpretive input on the constitutionality of abortion.
Regardless of the relative qualifications of judges and individual citizens,
knowledge (or lack of it) plays a critical role in determining both the composition of and the outcomes produced by constitutional culture. Low knowledge
levels leave many individuals excluded from the interpretive conversation, since
the well-informed are more likely to engage in political participation.227 Knowledgeable citizens are also more likely to have opinions, tend to be more stable
in those opinions, and are better able to discount specific information that
conflicts with larger values and belief systems. 228 Conversely, those with low
levels of political knowledge are less likely to participate or to have discemable
political opinions. Moreover, the opinions they have are often internally inconsistent and more easily subject to change. 229
As a result, high levels of ignorance often act to destabilize popular input into
constitutional culture. For the large number of Americans who operate under
conditions of low political awareness, individual opinions tend to be quite
malleable. 230 It is well known, for example, that responses to survey questions
vary dramatically depending upon how a particular question is asked and the
225. See FIORINA, ABRAMS & POPE, supra note 198, at 130.
226. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 236.
227. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 186-87.
228. Id. at 230-35.
229. Id. at 265.
230. See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 111, at 30-32; Philip E. Converse, The Nature of
Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206, 240 (David E. Apter ed., 1964)
(presenting data showing high instability in public opinion on a range of policy issues over a two-year
period). But see Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public and Beyond, in CITIZEN
COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 95, at 93, 93 (arguing that Americans' collective
policy preferences are real, measurable, and stable).
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nature of the information provided. 231 They are also affected by contextual
factors like the perceived degree of social conflict involved232 and the presentation of simple counterarguments. 233 Indeed, many Americans simply hold no
opinion at all, 234 possess significant ambivalence about the opinions they
have, 235 or form their preferences through a process in which contradictory
information is converted into an opinion based upon how recently the information was acquired, rather than through employing a pre-existing set of values or
deliberative reftection. 236
To explain how public opinion operates in these conditions, political scientists place significant emphasis on the role of political elites-politicians,
journalists, policy experts, certain activists-in opinion formation. 237 When
individuals seek to learn about an area with which they have little familiarity,
like the Constitution, they rely upon elites to provide relevant information, and
to define salient issues and considerations.2 38 Individuals also look to elites as
signaling devices, since the source of the information, rather than the content,
often serves as a cue to help a citizen determine where he or she stands on a
particular issue. 239
Lack of basic political knowledge creates a fertile opportunity for elites to
manipulate public opinion or distort the interpretive messages sent through
participatory acts. These conditions give rise to the potential for what Zaller
calls "elite domination," where "elites induce citizens to hold opinions that they

231. See ZALLER, supra note 150, at 30, 33-34, 80-85.
232. Funk, supra note 188, at 198-203.
233. PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RAcE 144 (presenting survey data showing
that "substantial numbers of white respondents will change positions on racial policy issues when
confronted with counterarguments"); James L. Gibson, A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in
Persuading Russians To Tolerate, 42 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 819-50 (1998) (concluding that presentation of
counterarguments was "quite effective" at changing Russians' initial responses to questions about
political tolerance).
234. Converse, supra note 230, at 245. But see Christopher H. Achen, Mass Political Attitudes and
the Survey Response, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1218 (1975) (using empirical data to attack Converse's
non-attitude thesis).
235. R. Michael Alvarez & John Brehm, American Ambivalence Towards Abortion Policy: Development of a Heteroskedastic Probit Model of Competing Values, 39 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 1055, 1077 (1995)
(presenting study showing deep ambivalence and internal conflict over abortion-related issues); Dennis
Chong, How People Think, Reason, and Feel About Rights and Liberties, 37 AM. J. POL. Sci. 867, 897
(1993) (presenting study showing that "people experience considerable ambivalence over many civil
liberties controversies"); Stanley Feldman & John Zaller, The Political Culture of Ambivalence:
Ideological Responses to the Welfare State, 36 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 268, 293 (1992) (calling ambivalence "a
fundamental feature" of public opinion about the welfare system).
236. ZALLER, supra note 150, at 42-51.
237. Id. at 6; Marc J. Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization, 95
AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 619, 621-22 (2001).
238. See, e.g., LuPIA & McCuBBINS, supra note 149, at 64; ZALLER, supra note 150, at 6; Franklin &
Kosaki, supra note 168, at 369 ("[M]edia coverage of the Supreme Court is a key determinant of what
people know of its decisions.").
239. ZALLER, supra note 150, at 14, 45.
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would not hold if aware of the best available information and analysis." 240
Several studies suggest that by "framing" 241 a salient constitutional issue in a
particular way, elites can significantly affect public opinion about that issue,
including the 2000 presidential election, abortion, affirmative action, and civil
liberties. 242 Indeed, the potential for elite domination exists even during historical periods of high civic engagement and constitutional change. 243
Under conditions of elite domination, the choice between juricentric and
popular-constitutionalist models is less stark than it initially appears. Rather
than a battle between the Court and the People for interpretive authority, the real
power struggle is between a small number of competing (and often selfinterested) elites-including the Court-that operate under a loose set of political constraints brought about in large part by low levels of political knowledge.
The People operate primarily as passive spectators, occasionally weighing in
through periodic elections but remaining largely disengaged.244

240. Id. at 313; see also Thomas E. Nelson & Donald R. Kinder, Issue Frames and Group-Centrism
in American Public Opinion, 58 J. PoL. 1055 (1996) (arguing that citizens' public policy preferences are
dependent on how issues are framed by elites).
241. By framing, I refer to "the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles that a speaker uses
when relaying information to another." James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for
Citizen Competence, 23 POL BEHAv. 225, 227 (2001); see also ZALLER, supra note 150, at 311-12
(discussing elite manipulation of public opinion); Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mark R. Joslyn, Gun
Policy, Opinion, Tragedy, and Blame Attribution: The Conditional Influence of Issue Frames, 63 J. PoL.
520, 529 (showing that Jess knowledgeable citizens are more susceptible to elite issue-framing on
opinions about proposed Jaw allowing carrying of concealed handguns). But see James N. Druckman &
Kjersten R. Nelson, Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence, 47
AM. J. PoL. Sci. 729 (2003) (arguing that discussions with other citizens mediate the impact of elite
influence).
242. See Chong, supra note 235, at 898 (showing susceptibility of study participants to framing of
civil liberties issues); Donald R. Kinder & Lynn M. Sanders, Mimicking Political Debate with Survey
Questions: The Case of White Opinion on Affirmative Action for Blacks, 8 Soc. CooNmON 73, 96 ( 1990)
(showing effects of framing on opinion about affirmative action); Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee A.
Clawson & Zoe M. Oxley, Media Framing of a Civil Libenies Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance, 91
AM. PoL. Sa. REv. 567, 579 (1997) (showing how framing of a Ku Klux Klan march controversy as a
"free speech" or "public safety" issue affects public opinion); Stephen P. Nicholson & Robert M.
Howard, Framing Supponfor the Supreme Coun in the Aftermath of Bush v. Gore, 65 J. PoL. 676, 693
(2003) (showing how framing Bush v. Gore affected specific and diffuse support for the Court). But see
James N. Druckman, On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?, 63 J. PoL. 1041 (2001)
(presenting two experiments suggesting that elite framing is constrained by the credibility of the
frame's source).
243. Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the New Deal Experience,
495 WM. & MARYL. REv. 595, 662-63 (2003) (concluding that New Deal economic legislation was the
result of efforts by elites to exploit voter ignorance).
244. Richard Posner calls this vision "Concept 2" democracy. Concept 2 democrats "see politics as a
competition among self-interested politicians, constituting a ruling class, for the support of the people,
also assumed to be self-interested, and to be none too interested in or well informed about politics ....
It is rule by officials who are, however, chosen by the people and who if they don't perform to
expectations are fired by the people at the end of a short fixed or limited term of office." PosNER, supra
note 175, at 143-44.
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B. PARTICIPATORY DISTORTION

Even when the People speak, their input reflects the wide disparities in wealth
and power that exist throughout American political life. As Christopher Eisgruber points out, "constitutional theorists ... have not paid much attention to the
possibility of a conceptual distinction between 'the electorate' and 'the
people.' " 245 For popular constitutionalists, the result of this oversight is a failure
to acknowledge the distorted nature of the People's interpretive voice. 246
The process of citizen-interpreters opting in and out of constitutional culture
creates the potential for "participatory distortion," a condition where "political
activists do not reflect accurately the larger population from which they come
with respect to some politically relevant characteristic." 247 This distortion can
take place on a large scale; participants fail to represent the polity as a whole. It
can also occur on a smaller scale; elites who represent a particular group's
interests fail to represent that group's policy preferences, 248 or elected representatives fail to reflect the demography or ideological preferences of their constituencies. 249
In the most comprehensive study of participatory distortion to date, Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady concluded that political participants differ from the
public at large in critical ways, particularly in demographic composition and
political preferences. As a result, the political component of constitutional
culture sends out distorted messages to political institutions about the People's
interests, preferences, and needs. 250
Wealth and education are the strongest predictors of political participation. 251
The rich and well-educated are more likely to vote, sign petitions, attend rallies,
contribute money, or work on campaigns. 252 According to Verba and his coauthors, with the exception of voting, the affluent are more than twice as likely

245. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply to Five
Critics, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 115, ll9 (2002).
246. This omission reflects the invisibility of class in American social and legal discourse. See
Deborah C. Malamud, "Who They Are---0r Were": Middle-Class Welfare in the Early New Deal, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 2019, 2019-20 (2003).
247. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 178.
248. Id. at 478-80 & n.14 (summarizing literature on participatory distortion among party elites and
activists). For example, despite the general liberal bent among Latino elected officials, Latinos as a
whole express significant skepticism about the merits of government assistance programs for the poor.
249. Id. at 165 nn.3-4 (summarizing literature showing that elected representatives do not reflect the
demographics of their constituencies).
250. Id. at 464.
251. See, e.g., CONWAY, supra note ll2, at 25-30; BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFrER, PoLmcs
BY 0rnER MEANS: THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 189-90 (1990); RosENSTONE &
HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236-38; E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW
OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 34-35 (2d ed. 1975) ("The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly
chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent."); VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 188;
WOLFINGER & RosENSTONE, supra note 126, at 13-36.
252. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236-38; VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26,
at 190.
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to be active in every other form of political activity. 253 The close relationship
between socioeconomic status and participation implicates race and sex as well.
Demographic groups with comparatively lower levels of income and education,
like African-Americans, Latinos, and women, 254 are underrepresented among
participants. 255
Echoing disparities in participation, "information about politics is as inequitably distributed as wealth in the mass public." 256 The most knowledgeable are
disproportionately concentrated among the well educated, 257 while political
ignorance is highest among women, racial minorities, and the poor. 258
These inequities in political knowledge are mirrored in the realm of constitutional culture. Those with high levels of knowledge about the Court appear to
share two characteristics: they are well educated, and they pay a lot of attention
to politics outside the Court. 259 For example, among the most politically aware,
over 95% knew about the Webster decision, while virtually no one at the lower
end of the awareness continuum knew anything about the case. 260 In particular,
post-secondary education is significant in determining institutional knowledge
about the Court. Delli Carpini and Keeter found that while fewer than one-third
of high school graduates were able to identify who nominates Supreme Court
justices or which branch of government determines the constitutionality of laws,
80% of college graduates were able to correctly answer both questions. 261
Citizens who possess traits associated with higher socioeconomic status are
also the greatest beneficiaries of participatory distortion. Since citizens with
education and money participate at higher rates than the rest of the population,
they gain an overrepresentative voice in constitutional culture. 262
This is particularly true for campaign contributions, which carry higher levels
of distortion than any other participatory activity. 263 As one might expect,
campaign contributions are drawn disproportionately from the very well-off. 264

253. VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 189; See also Theda Skocpol, Voice and
Inequality: The Transformation of American Civic Democracy, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 1, 12 (2004) ("Americans who are not wealthy or higher-educated now have fewer associations representing their values and
interests, and enjoy dwindling opportunities for active participation.").
254. CONWAY, supra note 112, at 34 ("Latino citizens have lower rates of voter registration and
turnout and of engagement in other forms of political participation than do either white citizens or black
citizens."); VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 307-08.
255. Conway reports that while women are as likely as men to vote in presidential and midterm
elections, significant but diminishing disparities continue to exist in participation in campaign activity.
See CONWAY, supra note 112, at 36-39; VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 465.
256. See Philip E. Converse, Information Flow and the Stability of Panisan Attitudes, 26 Pus.
OPINION Q. 578, 582 (I 962).
257. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 278.
258. Id. at 177; Somin, supra note 153, at 6.
259. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 181, at 635, 653; Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 168, at 353.
260. ZALLER, supra note 150, at 17-18.
261. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 191-92.
262. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236-38.
263. VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 516-17.
264. Id. at 361, 482.
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According to one study, the wealthiest 5% of the population supply 17% of
campaign donors, while the poorest 16% supply only 4%. 265 During the 2000
election, households that earned over $100,000 were responsible for 85% of
donations over $200, even though they comprised only 13.4% of the population.266 Similar distortion effects are seen in citizen interactions with legislators.
According to survey data collected between 1976 and 1988, while collegeeducated people account for 35% of the population, they make up 56% of those
who write letters to Congress. 267
In and of itself, demographic distortion is not necessarily a problem, as long
as those who participate do a reasonably good job of reflecting the views of
nonparticipants. Voting, the most common form of political participation, contains far less ideological distortion than one might expect. Several studies
confirm that voters, at least for now, do a reasonably good job of reflecting the
policy (but not necessarily the interpretive) preferences of the country as a
whole. 268
But other forms of participation are far more susceptible to ideological
distortion. For example, compared with the population as a whole, campaign
contributors are significantly more tolerant of different political viewpoints and
adopt more conservative attitudes on economic issues. 269 Not surprisingly,
protesters-a critical group in many popular constitutionalist narratives-carry
an ideologically liberal distortion. 270
VI.

THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

In light of the political science literature, we can now draw a few preliminary
descriptive conclusions about the People's role in contemporary constitutional
culture.

265. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236-38.
266. Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 73, 76 (2004).
267. RosENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236. By contrast, those with the least education (10%
of the population) make up 4% of those who write letters. Id.
· 268. See, e.g., VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 205 ("Voters and non-voters do not
seem to differ substantially in their attitudes on public policy issues."); Michael M. Gant & William
Lyons, Democratic Theory, Nonvoting, and Public Policy: The 1972-I988 Presidential Elections, 21
AM. PoL. Q. 185, 194 (1993) (finding "no strong patterns of significant differences between voters and
nonvoters" in thirty-five policy positions over five elections); Stephen D. Shaffer, Policy Differences
Between Voters and Non-voters in American Elections, 35 W. PoL. Q. 496, 509 (1982) (presenting study
showing "policy differences between voters and non-voters are presently neither large nor ideologically
consistent"). But see PATTERSON, supra note 132, at 13 (citing polls suggesting that if all eligible adults
had voted in the 2000 election, the Democrats would have won the Presidency and both houses of
Congress); Jack Citrin, Eric Schickler & John Sides, What If Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of
Increased Turnout in Senate Elections, 47 AM. J. PoL. Sc1. 75, 88 (2003) (concluding that there are
"meaningful differences in the partisan leanings of voters and non-voters").
269. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 482, 505. For the questions used to gauge
tolerance or economic opinion, see id. at 552, 555.
270. Id. at 485. Verba et al. attribute this distortion to race and age: The protesting population
contains more African-Americans and young people than the population as a whole. Id. at 485-87.
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First, many Americans simply want nothing to do with constitutional culture.
Moreover, to the extent the Court is engaging the People in a dialogue about
constitutional aspirations, the People are not doing a particularly good job of
holding up their end of the conversation. Apathy, disengagement, and low levels
of political knowledge are enduring forces in modern political culture, and-if
generational trends remain consistent-will continue to be for the foreseeable
future. Their omission, particularly in policentrist narratives, creates an inaccurate picture of constitutional culture in practice, one that gerrymanders recent
political history to highlight isolated moments of civic engagement while
whitewashing the distant relationship between large segments of the polity and
the interpretive process.
Second, the People do not serve as a particularly stable or reliable check on
the Court's interpretive power. Popular interpretive preferences, where they
exist, are often made without much awareness about politics generally, or the
Constitution and the Court in particular. A public that is unaware of constitutional culture cannot engage in a conversation about shared constitutional
values with the Court or any other interpretive actors. Further, once a preference
is ascertained, it often proves unstable and easily susceptible to elite influence,
lending a distinctly dubious quality to popular communications across the
law-politics divide. Political institutions seeking to discern interpretive preferences are left with a melange of conflicting information that is easily subject to
manipulation.
Third, constitutional culture reflects the disparities of wealth and power that
permeate our political culture. Popular input is derived primarily from an
unrepresentative minority of Americans that, curiously enough, shares many
demographic traits with constitutional theorists and Supreme Court judges.
Knowledge of and participation in constitutional culture are disproportionately
concentrated among well-educated, financially secure individuals who are highly
attentive to political life. Moreover, the increased use of checkbook participation reinforces the upper-crust complexion of popular constitutionalism in
practice. Hence, while the composition of the Court is far from representativeunder virtually any demographic metric-granting the People heightened interpretive input presents its own set of problems.
Fourth, constitutional culture often acts to reinforce juricentric norms and
legitimize judicial authority. As a forum for disagreement, many Americans see
the courts as a preferable alternative to direct participation or a flawed political
process. Even when the Court risks its political capital, as it did with Bush v.
Gore, its public support remains solid. 271 Further, a declining sense of external
and internal efficacy leaves the People predisposed to outsource constitutional
disagreements to judicial fora.

271. See Friedman, supra note 95, at 2627-29; James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester
Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted
or Othenvise, 33 BRIT. J. PoL. Sc1. 535, 555 (2003).
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Finally, the contemporary political environment presents a number of serious
operational challenges for increased popular constitutionalism in the foreseeable
future. Younger generations disproportionately reflect overall declines in political interest, participation, and efficacy. A citizen-interpreter who lacks faith in
her own ability to master the skills necessary to participate in constitutional
dialogues, or believes that political institutions are unresponsive to popular
input, is unlikely to participate in constitutional culture. Moreover, a political
culture that doubts the People's capacity for self-governance is unlikely to
respond well to heightened popular input in constitutional lawmaking outside
Article V. In such a context, it is likely that Americans, who already make
interpretive decisions based on limited information, will doubt their ability to
fully understand basic constitutional issues and opt out of the interpretive
process.
As realist democratic theorists have long held, declining levels of participation do not necessarily present an immediate threat to the People's ability to
check institutional actors. 272 Indeed, a dramatic increase in political participation could present a potential threat to democratic stability. 273 Yet the decline is
worrisome, if not for the present then for the future. As participation declines, it
heightens the risk that constitutional meaning will reflect only the self-interest
of a limited number of participants-primarily the rich and well-educatedwhile effectively silencing the constitutional perspectives of a large segment of
the American population. 274 Decreased participation also means that constitutional culture will become increasingly dominated by a small number of intense
issue activists whose views differ substantially from those of nonparticipants. 275
Further, if one of popular constitutionalism's primary normative virtues is its
ability to initiate a national conversation about constitutional values-to give
the People a sense of ownership over the document and its meaning-this virtue
is at risk when fewer people participate in constitutional culture. If the People
are ill-equipped, unwilling, or unable to engage in a larger cultural dialogue
about constitutional meaning, "constitutional culture" may amount to little more
than an academic construction or a series of observations by pundits on a
Sunday morning talk show.
Despite efforts by policentrists to highlight the role of popular input in the
development of constitutional doctrine, the moments of constitutional empower-

272. Griffin, supra note 21, at 526.
273. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 14 (1970) ("The fact that nondemocratic attitudes are relatively more common among the inactive means that any increase in
participation by the apathetic would weaken the consensus on the norms of the democratic method.").
274. The notion that our system of constitutional governance exists to promote the class-based
interests of a political and economic elite has well-established theoretical roots. See CHARLES A. BEARD,
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
275. See Steven Earl Bennett & David Resnick, The Implications of Nonvoting for Democracy in the
United States, 34 AM. J. PoL. Sc1. 771, 800 (1990). Indeed, Mark Tushnet argues that America is in the
midst of a "new constitutional order" marked by "a public that does not participate in politics and weak
parties but highly partisan institutions in a divided government." TusHNET, supra note 56, at 19.
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ment they point to often bear a distant relationship to contemporary reality.
Moreover, for juridominant critics, a population that avoids participation in
civic life, doubts its capacity to understand political issues, expresses skepticism
about its ability to influence political outcomes, and has little interest in civic
life, is a poor subject for constitutional models that rely upon voluntary participation as a necessary component.
How can we explain the reluctance to acknowledge these trends-obvious to
any political scientist-among popular constitutionalists? For one thing, constitutional theorists have steadily avoided empirical studies of any kind, preferring
to use normative or historical lenses to explain or advocate for interpretive
developments. 276 Moreover, as long as constitutional theorists remain committed to relitigating the countermajoritarian difficulty, 277 there will be a need to
maintain democratic legitimacy within the political branches to counteract the
antidemocratic features of judicial review. 278
But something else is at work.
Contemporary constitutional theory is dominated by scholars who remain
highly influenced by politically formative experiences from the civil rights
era. 279 They (or their mentors) attended college during an era of heightened
political efficacy, and found themselves among others who shared a belief in
their ability to change the political system. 280 Protest was a primary means for
accomplishing change, 281 and many within this age cohort were actively engaged in a popular constitutionalist discourse that centered around racial justice,
women's rights, and class division. These experiences have brought historical
instances of popular empowerment into sharp descriptive focus, while relegating much of contemporary political life into the background. 282 I mention this
not to broadly pathologize a generation of scholars, but in an attempt to explain
how constitutional theory, now decades into its development as a discipline,

276. See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalization of
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REv. 28, 41 (2004).
277. See Friedman, History Pan Five, supra note 40, at 218-22 (describing the countennajoritarian
difficulty as an "obsession" among academics).
278. As Barry Friedman notes, constitutional theorists also overlook the numerous political constraints on the Court's interpretive discretion, including its institutional wellspring of diffuse support,
institutional composition, and independent sensitivity to political dynamics. See Friedman, supra note
95, at 2614-17.
279. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 19, at 1090-92.
280. The period between ages eighteen and twenty-six is "the most crucial age range for the creation
of a distinctive, self-conscious political generation." M. KENT JENNINGS & RICHARD G. NIEMI, GENERATIONS AND PoLmcs: A PANEL STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS AND THEIR PARENTS 7 (1981).
281. Id. at 333 ("For those who lived through the protest period it may have seemed that nearly
every young person was a protestor, in either incipient or manifest form."); Jennings, supra note 103, at
369 (estimating that three in ten of all college graduates had taken part in a demonstration, protest
march, or sit-in between 1965 and 1973, a level far higher than the rest of the population). See supra
note 219 for contemporary data on protesting.
282. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULALLED
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 1-2 (2004) (describing "awe and respect" shown by educated elites to
Brown, "a decision that promised so much and, by its terms, accomplished so little").
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continues to treat the People as a vague abstraction. 283
If popular constitutionalists truly intend to view constitutional lawmaking as
the product of a culture in which law and politics intersect, they can no longer
treat politics and the People as interchangeable concepts. Indeed, if constitutional theory is evolving from the normative search for a dominant interpretive
paradigm to a descriptive inquiry into the political and legal interactions that
underlie judicial review, 284 it is no longer sufficient to rely upon abstractions
like "the People."
Instead, our theoretical inquiry must become more sophisticated about how
political realities operate within constitutional culture. For example, does widespread political apathy offer an opportunity for an ambitious and confident
Court to expand its interpretive authority? Do contemporary political conditions
create incentives for interpretive restraint by other political institutions? Can a
constitutional culture that operates under these conditions sustain its legitimacy?
How prominent is the role of elite opinion and polarization? How do emotions
operate within and influence constitutional culture? How exactly do courts
internalize constitutional claims made outside the courtroom? How much legitimacy do extrajudicial constitutional norms have as law? Given relatively low
levels of political knowledge, how credible are the conclusions we draw about
popular interpretive preferences? How does the ebb and flow of participation
affect constitutional interpretation and the behavior of courts? What levels of
participation are necessary for a constitutional culture to sustain its democratic
legitimacy? To what extent do the realities of participation and mobilization
distort constitutional outcomes in favor of certain groups? How does constitutional culture manifest itself on the state level?285
More often than not, these questions have either gone unasked, or the
answers lack empirical rigor. The result is constitutional theory that bears a
skewed relationship to contemporary practice.
CONCLUSION

Our past informs our current perspective, bringing certain elements and
structures into sharp focus while leaving others behind. This dynamic often
plays itself out on a generational scale, 286 as particular age cohorts share a
283. The notion that scholarship is influenced by historical paradigms that are often resistant to
developing-and sometimes contradictory-facts is not new. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIRC REVOLUTIONS 62-65 (3d ed. 1996). For a description of how this dynamic has operated within
constitutional theory, see Friedman, History Part Five, supra note 40, at 250 (describing mid-twentiethcentury theorists as "stuck in the paradigm of 'democratic faith' that they had inherited").
284. For an example of such an inquiry, see Barry Friedman, The Imponance of Being Positive: The
Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1257 (2005).
285. For example, the recent state-by-state skirmishes over same-sex marriage provide a comprehensive case study on the determination of constitutional meaning through complex interactions between
the judiciary, the legislature, and the public.
286. For the classic statement on generational theory, see Karl Mannheim, The Problem of Generations, in THE NEw PILGRIMS: YOUTH PROTEST IN TRANsmoN 101, 136 (Philip G. Altbach & Robert S.
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common experiential point of reference that affects the style and content of their
scholarship. It is no surprise, therefore, that scholars who formed their political
consciousness during an era of heightened civic engagement would produce
scholarship that seeks to integrate the role of social movements and politics into
constitutional theory.
In building upon their work, the post-Watergate generation faces a similar
challenge-to integrate our formative experience with the darker side of political life into the descriptive and normative course of constitutional theory. This
will involve embracing empirical work that transcends barriers imposed by
academic disciplines, and bringing greater sophistication to descriptive accounts
of constitutional culture. All too often, generations of constitutional theorists
have been seduced into the same modes of thinking as their predecessors. 287 We
must do our best to avoid that trap.

Laufer eds., 1972) ("The phenomenon of generations is one of the basic factors contributing to the
genesis of the dynamic of historical development.").
287. See Friedman, History Part Five, supra note 40, at 255 (describing how mid-century constitutional theorists "parroted their predecessors' words"); Friedman, supra note 78, at 938-39.

